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ARTICLES 
Profits-Only Partnership Interests 
Bradley T. Borden† 
Profits-only partnership interests grant service-providing 
partners an interest in the profits of a partnership but not its capital. 
Such interests are a proverbial double-edged sword: they create 
economic arrangements needed in business, but provide opportunities 
for inequitable tax reductions. Business participants make economic 
decisions to use profits-only partnership interests to reduce agency costs 
and appropriable rents. The current law, however, empowers business 
participants to form partnerships that are equivalent to employment 
arrangements and use profits-only partnership interests to obtain long-
term capital gains. Thus, with no economic consequences, they convert 
ordinary income (taxed at up to thirty-five percent) to long-term capital 
gain (taxed at fifteen percent). Commentators and lawmakers generally 
propose partnership disaggregation to eliminate the inequity. 
Partnership disaggregation changes the character of income (from 
capital gain to ordinary income) as it flows from the partnership to 
service-providing partners. Partnership disaggregation may enhance 
equity, but it ignores the nature of tax partnerships, threatens the 
partnership tax regime, and has other negative side effects. This Article 
suggests that partnership disregard is a better way to address the 
inequity caused by profits-only partnership interests. Partnership 
disregard uses economic concepts to identify the policy-relevant 
differences between tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements, 
such as employment arrangements, leases, and loans. Partnership 
disregard distinguishes arrangements that should qualify for partnership 
tax treatment from those that should not. It eliminates inequity while 
preserving the integrity of the partnership tax regime and other areas of 
the law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider a situation that plays out innumerable times each year. 
Two people, Cory and Travis, respectively own property and services. 
Cory and Travis would like to join Cory’s property and Travis’s services 
in a money-making enterprise. Planning for such enterprise, they face 
myriad legal, economic, and other considerations. Of particular interest 
are the economic considerations they face.1 The economic considerations 
include controlling appropriable quasi rents and agency costs.2 Cory and 
Travis have various tools at their disposal to help reduce such costs. For 
example, they can integrate the property and services to help reduce 
appropriable quasi rents,3 and they can use profit-sharing and other 
arrangements to help reduce agency costs.4 
After making decisions regarding the economic aspects of the 
arrangement, Cory and Travis must also consider the tax ramifications of 
the form they choose for their arrangement. The current law grants Cory 
and Travis significant latitude in choosing the type and amount of taxes 
they will pay. For example, if Cory were to hire Travis as an employee to 
manage the property and pay him a percent of the profits from the 
property, the compensation to Travis would be income.5 Travis’s tax rate 
on that income could reach as high as thirty-five percent.6 If Cory and 
Travis were to form a corporation and grant stock to Travis in exchange 
for his services, Travis would recognize compensation income on the 
  
 1 The economic considerations are of particular interest because they define the 
arrangement. The legal considerations are important because they help ensure that the parties are 
able to meet and preserve their economic objectives. Tax considerations are also important, but as 
this Article discusses, tax law should recognize the economic arrangement and not affect the parties’ 
decision. 
 2 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (defining agency 
costs as those costs that arise from an agent not always acting in the best interest of the principal, 
which costs include the principal’s monitoring expenditures of the agent, bonding expenditures by 
the agent, and residual loss incurred when the agent’s actions diverge from the principal’s interests); 
Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978) (defining 
appropriable quasi rents as the portion of the value of an item under contract in excess of its value in 
its next best use). 
 3 See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 2, at 307 (“[I]ntegration by common or 
joint ownership is more likely, the higher the appropriable specialized quasi rents of the assets 
involved.”). 
 4 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 786 (1972) (discussing situations in which profit 
sharing helps reduce shirking, a form of agency cost). 
 5 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a)(1) (as amended in 2003) (listing 
“compensation for services on the basis of percentage of profits” as “income to the recipient[] unless 
excluded by law”). All code and section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended, unless stated otherwise. 
 6 See I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (setting the maximum tax rate at thirty-five percent for taxable 
years beginning in 2003 or thereafter). This is the typical tax treatment of an investment advisor 
(such as a mutual fund company, a bank, or a broker) hired to manage another person’s property. 
Making payment of fees contingent on performance should not change the tax treatment.  
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grant of the stock.7 That income would be subject to the same tax rate, 
which could be as high as thirty-five percent. If the income from the 
property will be long-term capital gain, the parties could consider using a 
limited liability company that tax law treats as a partnership. The limited 
liability company would help convert Travis’s income to long-term 
capital gain, which would be subject to a fifteen percent tax rate.8 If the 
intent is to have an employment arrangement, the corporate form would 
alter the economics.9 The limited liability company does not, however, 
have to materially alter their economic arrangement. Thus, Travis and 
Cory can maintain their preferred economic arrangement but choose 
between two very different tax regimes. 
Several factors create such a stark difference in tax treatment. 
First, state law grants members of limited liability companies significant 
leeway in drafting their governing documents.10 Cory and Travis could 
draft an operating agreement that vests each with substantially the same 
rights and obligations they had under their employment agreement.11 
Second, the definition of tax partnership is ambiguous, but most tax 
practitioners, commentators, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
would agree that a limited liability company comes within the definition 
of tax partnership.12 That interpretation of the definition allows Cory and 
Travis to use a limited liability company to bring their arrangement 
within the purview of the partnership tax rules.13 Third, the partnership 
tax rules determine the character of income at the partnership level and 
flow that character through to the partners with the income.14 By forming 
  
 7 See id. § 83(a). 
 8 See id. § 1(h)(1)(C) (providing the fifteen percent rate for adjusted net capital gain, 
which would include long-term capital gains, see id. § 1222(11)). 
 9 Assuming the corporation has just one class of stock, Travis’s stock would grant him a 
residual interest in Cory’s property. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(b)(2) (1984); 1 MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.01 (4th ed. 2008) (providing that corporations must issue at least one class 
of stock that entitles the holders “to receive the net assets of the corporation upon dissolution”). 
 10 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 563 (2008) (providing that a 
limited liability company operating agreement has primacy over all but a short list of the state law 
default rules). 
 11 For example, Cory and Travis could agree that Cory could expel Travis from the 
limited liability company at will, and that upon expulsion, Travis would be entitled to no more than 
his accrued share of company income. The operating agreement could also grant Cory the right to 
make decisions with respect to the property, including whether Travis would continue providing 
services with respect to such property. 
 12 This assumes that the limited liability company does not elect to be taxed as a 
corporation. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006) (providing that eligible business 
entities, which would include limited liability companies, may elect to be taxed as corporations). 
 13 The federal definition of tax partnership is the gatekeeper for the partnership tax rules. 
See I.R.C. §§ 701-709 (applying the partnership tax rules to “partnership” as defined in sections 761 
and 7701(a)(2), the definition this Article refers to as tax partnership to recognize the modifications 
tax law has made to the non-tax definition of partnership). The partnership tax rules provide 
significant opportunity for shifting the incidence of taxation. Thus, the definition of tax partnership, 
as the gatekeeper, is a very important definition. 
 14 See id. § 702(b). Partnerships do not pay tax. Instead, they compute partnership 
taxable income and allocate the income to the partners. Id. §§ 702-704 (2000). Partners then pay tax 
individually on their distributive shares of partnership income. See id. § 701. 
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an entity that comes within the definition of tax partnership, Cory and 
Travis can create long-term capital gain at the partnership level and flow 
it through to the partners, including Travis, and reduce Travis’s tax rate 
by as many as twenty basis points, or by about fifty-seven percent.15 This 
is a significant difference for a mere change in form. 
Different tax treatment of economically similar arrangements 
causes serious concern. People in similar economic arrangements should 
pay a similar amount of tax. Also, tax law should not motivate the form a 
business arrangement takes. The law could address those concerns in a 
number of different ways. First, the law could ignore the problem and 
preserve inequitable taxation and encourage tax-motivated business 
planning. Second, the law could modify the rules of partnership tax law 
to alter the character of income that flows through to the service provider 
(i.e., partnership disaggregation). Third, the law could modify the 
definition of tax partnership to disregard arrangements that tax policy 
indicates do not warrant the use of the partnership tax rules (i.e., 
partnership disregard). Most commentary has focused on the second 
alternative—partnership disaggregation. This Article suggests, however, 
that partnership disregard finds better support in tax policy. 
The taxation of profits-only partnership interests has been the 
focus of an ongoing debate among academics, practitioners, taxpayers, 
and lawmakers.16 Commentators fall into one of two camps. Professor 
Victor Fleisher’s recent work represents the views of one camp (the 
compensation proponents), which argues that profits-only partnership 
interests are granted as compensation, at least in part, to a person who 
provides services to a partnership and should be taxed as such.17 
  
 15 The percent decrease is equal to the twenty basis point decrease divided by thirty-five 
percent. 
 16 Although profits-only partnership interests have emerged recently in the debate of 
carried interests, various court decisions and rulings that addressed the proper taxation of profit-only 
partnership interests spurred the debate. See Campbell v. Comm’r, 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that a profits-only interest had only speculative, if any, value and, therefore, the grant of 
such interest is not taxable); Diamond v. Comm’r, 492 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that 
the grant of a profits-only partnership interest with a determinable market value for past services is a 
taxable event); Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191 (providing guidance on the tax treatment of 
nonvested profits-only interests); Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 (providing for the tax-free 
treatment of the grant of most profits-only partnership interests). The House of Representatives 
passed H.R. 3996, the Temporary Tax Relief Act of 2007, on November 9, 2007, which would have 
added section 710 to the Internal Revenue Code and would have taxed income allocated to holders 
of certain profits-only partnership interests as compensation income. Temporary Tax Relief Act of 
2007, H.R. 3996, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, Nov. 9, 2007). Treasury and the IRS have also 
recently proposed rules for taxing profits-only partnership interests, which would have allowed the 
tax-free grant of profits-only partnership interests and the character of partnership income to flow 
through from the partnership. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,787, 10,790-91 
(June 3, 1971) (providing that “property includes a partnership interest,” which would place the 
grant of a profits-only partnership interest under the section 83 income recognition timing rules); 
I.R.S. Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221 (providing a proposed safe harbor that would allow a 
service provider to include the liquidation value (which should be zero) of a profits-only interest in 
income on the date of grant). 
 17 See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity 
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (2008) (recommending that at least a portion of the partnership 
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Compensation proponents tend to be academics, who are concerned with 
distributive equity.18 At the core of the argument is the apparent inequity 
that results when a service-providing partner is able to pay tax on 
significant amounts of allocated partnership profits at favorable long-
term capital gain rates.19 The other camp (the proponents of partnership-
level characterization) argues that any partnership profits allocated to a 
partner should retain the character determined at the partnership level.20 
They voice concern about the integrity and complexity of partnership tax 
law, found in subchapter K of the Code.21 The proponents of partnership-
level characterization fear that the current proposals for change would 
disrupt partnership tax law generally, create arbitrary lines between 
  
profits allocated to holders of profits-only partnership interests be taxed as ordinary income). Several 
other law professors have expressed their views as compensation proponents. See, e.g., Gregg D. 
Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversion, 122 TAX NOTES 743 (Feb. 9, 2009) (arguing 
that the conversion of management fees from compensation income to capital gain income lacks 
support in the law and violates fundamental principles of equity); see also Fair and Equitable Tax 
Policy for America’s Working Families: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th 
Cong. 58 (statement of Darryll K. Jones, Professor, Stetson U. College of Law) (recognizing the 
injustice of a person who makes $70,000 of compensation a year paying tax at ordinary income rates 
while fund managers make millions and pay tax at long-term capital gains rates); Carried Interest, 
Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Joseph 
Bankman, Professor, Stanford Law School) (supporting taxing carried interests as compensation to 
“increase economic welfare and make the tax law more equitable”); Carried Interest: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Mark P. Gergen, Founder Chair, 
U. of Texas School of Law) (commenting that the unfairness of the current law is evident and 
recommending that income allocated to a partner who provides services to a partnership should be 
ordinary income when the amount allocated is compensation).  
 18 See supra note 17. Not all academics who concern themselves with this issue are 
compensation proponents. See, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Not All Carried Interests are Created 
Equal (Washington Sch. of Law, Paper No. 08-12-02, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1315004 (arguing that amounts paid to service providers in private equity 
funds are a combination of labor and investment and the holding period of the property must be 
considered in determining the character of the income allocated to the service providers); David A. 
Weisbach, University of Chicago Professor Says Carried Interest Legislation is Misguided, 2007 
TAX NOTES TODAY 147-32, July 31, 2007 (analogizing an investment partnership to an individual 
investment and entrepreneurial effort and suggesting the character determined at the partnership 
level should flow through to the partners); Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests, 116 
TAX NOTES 1, 6 (2007) (“[T]he current system of taxation, though based on administrative 
convenience, ultimately reaches what is close to a proper result. And it is hard, both practically and 
conceptually, to draft a broad rule that reaches a better one.”). 
 19 See Fleischer, supra note 17, at 5, 50. The commentary cited above adequately 
describes the focus of the recent debate. See supra notes 17-18; see infra notes 20-21. This Article 
does not rehash those arguments but offers a new perspective and cites that commentary for the 
convenience of parties unfamiliar with the debate. 
 20 See generally David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 
94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008) (arguing generally that the nature of partnerships supports partnership-
level characterization); see also Leo L. Schmolka, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for 
Services: Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAX L. REV. 287, 288 (1991) (preferring the law to 
not tax profits-only partnership interests, but if it does to use a constructive loan method to tax only a 
portion that is treated as interest on a constructive loan to the service provider). 
 21 See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Taxing Partnership Profits Interests as Compensation 
Income, 119 TAX NOTES 829 (May 26, 2008) (describing significant limitations and potential 
damage to subchapter K that would result from proposed section 710, which would treat items 
allocated to certain service-providing partners as compensation income); Am. Bar Ass’n Section of 
Taxation, Comments on H.R. 2834, Nov. 13, 2007, available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2007/ 
071113commentshr2834.pdf [hereinafter “ABA Comments”].  
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different classes of partners, and send undesirable ripple effects through 
the Code.22  
This Article suggests that the differences between the two camps 
are attributable to the focus of analysis. In particular, focusing on 
partnership disaggregation creates a stalemate between the two camps. If 
the analysis changes its focus from partnership disaggregation to 
partnership disregard,23 the two camps may find a harmonious solution to 
the problem profits-only partnership interests pose. 
All profits-only partnership interests present a significant 
conceptual challenge because partnerships are very complex 
arrangements. The complexity makes properly identifying relationships 
among partners and partnerships difficult, which in turn makes tax 
lawmaking difficult. Partnerships are as old as private business and a 
natural part of our economy, which adds to the importance of partnership 
tax lawmaking.24 The prevalence of partnerships and their scope both in 
terms of absolute size and span of societal cross sections add to their 
uniqueness among business arrangements. A partnership may be any of 
the following: a business arrangement between two unsuspecting 
entrepreneurs, a complicated investment arrangement, or a joint venture 
between multi-national energy companies. Partnership’s unique nature 
requires tax rules that are often significantly different from tax rules 
governing other arrangements. Because any partnership could grant one 
of its members a profits-only partnership interest, tax law governing 
profits-only partnership interests should produce accurate and consistent 
tax results regardless of the type or size of partnership in question. The 
law should also be equitable and efficient. Partnership disaggregation 
does not accomplish those goals. 
Partnerships fall into three general categories: (1) services 
partnerships, (2) property-services partnerships, and (3) investment 
partnerships.25 Understanding these different types of partnerships helps 
  
 22 See infra Part III.C. (discussing the potential problems of proposed rules for taxing 
profits-only partnership interests). 
 23 This suggestion is, in some respects, a reminder of the instruction Congress gave to 
Treasury in 1984 to promulgate regulations that would “provide, when appropriate, that the 
purported partner performing services . . . is not a partner at all. Once it is determined that the 
service performer . . . is actually a partner, the committee believes the factors described below 
should be considered in determining whether the partner is receiving the putative allocation and 
distribution in his capacity as a partner.” S. COMM. ON FIN., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., DEFICIT 
REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 
21, 1984, at 227 (Comm. Print 1984). It also reflects the holding in Estate of Smith v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, 313 F.2d 724, 736 (8th Cir. 1963), in which the court held that a relationship 
between investors and an investment manager was not a partnership.  
 24 See generally Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43 
GA. L. REV. 717 (2009) (discussing the human tendency to form partnerships for business reasons, 
the legal and tax issues partnerships raise, and tax law’s obligation to minimize interference with the 
human tendency to form partnerships); Henry Fr. Lutz, Babylonian Partnership, 4 J. ECON. BUS. 
HIST. 552, 557-64 (1932) (describing Babylonian partnerships that emerged 4000 years ago with the 
arrangement of private property and business). 
 25  See infra Part II.A (describing the different types of partnerships). 
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distill three different types of interests in partnerships, namely: (1) 
profits-only partnership interests, (2) capital-only partnership interests, 
and (3) capital-profits partnership interests.26 Understanding and 
distinguishing the various types of partnerships is critical to develop the 
proper analytical model for profits-only interests. Also critical to the 
analysis is a working knowledge of the nature of partnerships.27 With that 
background, the weaknesses of partnership disaggregation become 
apparent,28 and the appeal of partnership disregard reveals itself.29 
II. TAX PARTNERSHIPS AND INTERESTS IN TAX PARTNERSHIPS 
The terms “partnership” and “partner” have multiple meanings 
depending upon the context in which they appear. People may use the 
terms colloquially to refer to intimate or other non-business 
relationships.30 Business professionals may use the terms informally to 
refer to an arrangement that may have any of various legal forms.31 The 
term partnership also has a technical meaning. It is “an association of 
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”32 
The definition helps define an arrangement and establish the rights and 
obligations of its members.33 
The federal tax definition is much broader than the technical 
non-tax definition. It may include partnerships, limited partnerships, 
limited liability companies, and arrangements that fail to satisfy the 
definition of all of those arrangements, such as a state-law tenancy in 
common.34 To avoid confusion, this Article uses the term tax partnership 
  
 26  See infra Part II.B (discussing the different types of partnership interests). 
 27  See infra Part II.C (discussing the nature of partnerships). 
 28  See infra Part III (demonstrating the inadequacies of partnership disaggregation). 
 29  See infra Part IV (illustrating partnership disregard in the profits-only context). 
 30 See, e.g., Nicolette Priaulx, Rethinking Progenitive Conflict: Why Reproductive 
Autonomy Matters, 16 MED. L. REV. 169, 179 (2008) (referring to the woman and man involved in 
making child-bearing decisions as partners); Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There 
Is? “The Problem” in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 899 (2008) 
(observing that including aggrieved parties in the mediation process more often would help make 
them partners in the negotiation). 
 31 Business people must, however, use care in making such references because doing so 
may create a legal partnership with its concomitant consequences. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & 
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 2.05(b) (Supp. 2009) 
(identifying cases in which parties exposed themselves to joint and several liability by holding 
themselves out as partners). 
 32 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 61 (2001). 
 33 See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, § 2.02(a) (recognizing the existence of a 
partnership is never the immediate issue, but creditors, for example, often raise the question in 
searching for a solvent defendant). 
 34 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2006) (“Whether an owner is an 
entity separate from its owners for federal tax purposes is a matter of federal tax law and does not 
depend on whether the organization is recognized as an entity under local law.”); Bradley T. Borden, 
The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 925, 982-84 (2006) (suggesting that 
the state law should not govern tax partnership classification, but some courts appear to still rely 
upon it). 
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to refer to any arrangement subject to partnership tax law. The definition 
of tax partnership is somewhat unclear,35 but tax law definitely 
recognizes tax partnerships.36 The discussion below concludes that much 
of the debate over the proper tax treatment of profits-only partnership 
interests results from the current unclear definition of tax partnership. 
Despite the lack of clarity, three general types of arrangements appear to 
come within the current definition of tax partnership. 
A.   Types of Tax Partnerships 
Despite the unclear definition, a tax partnership exists when two 
or more persons integrate services and share profits from the integrated 
services or when two or more persons integrate property and services and 
share the profits from the property-services integration.37 This Article 
generally refers to combinations of property and services because such 
combinations raise compelling theoretical issues. The discussions often 
could apply equally to service combinations. The tax partnership 
definition used in this Article adopts the term “integration” to imply the 
shared control of the property and services.38 Thus, to come within the 
definition of tax partnership the parties to an arrangement must share 
ownership and control of the partnership property and services.39 This is 
  
 35 See WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL 
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶ 3.01[1] (3d ed. Supp. IV 2006) (“The most basic, 
and perhaps the most difficult, problem in the taxation of partnerships and partners is the 
determination whether a particular financial, business, or otherwise economic arrangement 
constitutes a partnership for income tax purposes.”). 
 36 See supra note 13. 
 37 For an arrangement to be a tax partnership, the members must share ownership/control 
of the property and services and must divide the profits of the combined resources. See generally 
Borden, supra note 34 (discussing the definition of tax partnership). A tax partnership may also exist 
if the parties do not combine services, but the Author argues that such arrangements should not be 
tax partnerships. See id. at 1010-11. 
 38 The combination of property and services, or just services, gives partnerships their 
unique nature. See Borden, supra note 24, at 752-61. The same concept is contained in the UPA 
definition of partnership, which uses co-ownership and business to capture the ideas of combining 
services and/or property for profit. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 61 
(2001) (defining partnership as “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit”). The UPA definition of partnership does not serve tax law because it uses 
nontax concepts and terms that do not translate well for tax purposes. See Borden, supra note 34, at 
1008-11.  
 39 See Borden, supra note 24, at 744-52 (discussing ownership and control of property 
and services); infra text accompanying notes 83-88. This discussion uses the term control instead of 
ownership because many of the legal forms used as tax partnerships vest ownership in a separate 
legal entity. See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 203 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 96 (2001) (providing that 
“property acquired by a partnership is [partnership] property”); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 
112(b)(2) (1996), 6B U.L.A. 572 (2008) (providing that a limited liability company has the powers 
to own real or personal property). Furthermore, control and integration are economic concepts used 
to help explain why persons form business arrangements. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. 
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. 
ECON. 691, 693-94 (1986) (recognizing that virtual definition of ownership is the power to exercise 
control); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 2, at 299 (describing vertical integration as joint 
ownership). The question of why persons form business arrangements is critical to understanding the 
nature of partnerships. 
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a spin-off of the substantive law definition of partnership.40 Although the 
definition is fraught with shortcomings when used for tax purposes,41 it 
remains a significant part of partnership tax law.42 Under that definition, 
tax partnerships can be one of three different types: (1) services 
partnerships, (2) property-services partnerships, or (3) investment 
partnerships. Each type of partnership can grant profits-only partnership 
interests. Understanding the various types of tax partnerships and 
interests in tax partnerships facilitates the analysis of profits-only 
partnership interests.  
1. Services Partnerships 
A two-person law partnership is an example of a services 
partnership. Consider such a partnership. Upon completing tax LL.M.s, 
Sarah and Joline decide to form a law firm. They form Jorah Law Firm, a 
state-law partnership, and agree to share the expenses of the firm equally 
and divide profits in such a way that Sarah will receive 60% of the 
profits from work she originates and Joline will receive 60% of the 
profits from work she originates. They have no assets to contribute,43 so 
their combination of services and profit sharing creates a services 
partnership. Even though the profit-sharing arrangement favors the 
rainmaker, each partner takes an interest in the other’s services.44  
Partnership tax law characterizes income at the partnership 
level.45 Income of a services partnership is income from services. The 
income flows to the partners as income from services.46 The taxation of 
interests in such arrangements is not heavily disputed.47 The general lack 
  
 40 See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 41 See Borden, supra note 34, at 1008-11. 
 42 Courts and the IRS have reduced the definition to sets of factors. See, e.g., Ayrton 
Metal Co. v. Comm’r, 299 F.2d 741, 742 (2d Cir. 1962); Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-78 
(1964); Alhouse v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1678, 1680 (1991), aff’d, 12 F.3d 166 (9th Cir. 
1993); Rev. Proc. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 733, 735-37; see also Borden, supra note 34, at 975-82 
(discussing the use of substantive law to define tax partnership). 
 43 The landlord has agreed to waive rent for the first six months they occupy their office 
space. Joline and Sarah will cover all other expenses using credit or with revenues they earn. 
 44 A person cannot control or own another individual. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIII, § 1. 
Nonetheless, individuals may grant to others an economic interest in the product of their services. 
Such grant of an economic interest is an important aspect of the virtue of partnerships. See infra text 
accompanying notes 90-97. 
 45 See I.R.C. § 702(b) (2006). 
 46 See id. 
 47 To the extent one exists, the point of dispute may be that partnership tax law should 
allocate tax items according to each partner’s capital account balances. Several commentators have 
made that argument. See, e.g., Darryll K. Jones, Towards Equity and Efficiency in Partnership 
Allocations, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1047, 1093 (2006) (proposing that “capital account allocations should 
constitute the norm—the accurate safe harbor—but in certain circumstances proven by the partners, 
the allocations might be made in a different manner to achieve optimal economic efficiency”); 
William J. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences Under Federal Tax 
Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 15, 39-40 (1995) (recommending that partnerships be subject to the rigid 
allocation rules of subchapter S of the Code); George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private 
Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX. REV. 141, 203 (1999) (proposing that partnerships of individuals be 
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of controversy regarding the taxation of interests in services partnerships 
is likely attributable to the character of services partnerships’ income. 
The partnership’s services income flows through to the partners. Because 
the partners recognize income from services, they cannot obtain 
favorable tax rates. Instead, they pay income on such amounts at 
ordinary income rates. Such treatment is not controversial. 
2. Property-Services Partnerships 
A simple example illustrates a property-services partnership. Rex 
recently built an office building, which he has been managing alone. As 
the building fills up, he realizes he needs help to meet all of the demands 
of managing a full office building. Lee joins Rex to form Leex 
Partnership. Rex contributes his building, all of the existing leases, and 
his services to Leex Partnership; Lee contributes his services to Leex 
Partnership. Thus, they will share control of the office building and share 
the management responsibilities of the office building. Rex and Lee 
agree that they will divide the income from the partnership 60% to Rex 
and 40% to Lee. They also agree that if they ever sell the office building, 
they will equally divide any gain realized from the property’s 
appreciating after the partnership formation.48 The arrangement between 
Rex and Lee is a tax partnership because they combine property and 
services and share the profits from their combined resources. As partners, 
Rex and Lee both take an interest in each others’ contributed resources 
through the combination.49 Rex and Lee take an interest in the income-
producing potential of each others’ contributed services, and Lee takes 
an interest in the property’s income-producing potential. Income of this 
property-services partnership should include rental income and gain, if 
any, from the potential sale of the office building.50 Partnership tax law 
would flow that income through to the members and tax them according 
  
required to allocate all tax items “in accordance with the percentage interests of the residual interest 
holders”). Such treatment would ignore the partners’ economic arrangement. For instance, in the 
present example, Jorah Law Firm would have to allocate all tax items equally to Joline and Sarah 
because they both would have the same zero balance in their capital accounts. That result does not 
recognize the partners’ agreement and therefore would produce a bad tax result. See Bradley T. 
Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of Tax-Item Transactions, 59 S.C. L. 
REV. 297, 340-46 (2008). Even though some commentators may question the appropriate allocation 
of income from services tax partnerships, no one disputes the character of such income. 
 48 Having decided to combine resources, Rex and Lee would allocate the income and 
gain to help reduce agency costs. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation, 
(July 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003790. For example, Lee’s share of future 
gain on the disposition of property will help encourage him to manage the property in such a manner 
that will help preserve the long-term value of the property. 
 49 See generally Borden, supra note 24, at 752-61 (discussing how partners integrate 
property and services and jointly own/control the combined resources including the product of 
services). 
 50 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3), (5) (providing that gross income includes gains from dealings in 
property and rents). 
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to tax rules that apply to rental income and gains from dealings in 
property.51 
Other property-services partnerships may generate services 
income. For example, assume Rachel and Christy decide to form 
Chrichel LLC, a lawn-mowing service. Rachel agrees to contribute all of 
the lawn mowing equipment, a customer list, and management and 
bookkeeping services. Christy agrees to contribute lawn mowing 
services. Rachel and Christy agree to equally divide the profit from the 
business. Because they integrate property and services and share the 
profits, the arrangement appears to be a tax partnership. The income of 
Chrichel LLC will be income from services.52 The difference between the 
character of Leex Partnership’s income and Chrichel LLC’s income 
appears to be whether the property or services are the more dominant 
income-producing factor. The property in Leex Partnership arguably 
plays a bigger income-producing role than the property in Chrichel LLC. 
Tenants of an office building seek working space. They expect services 
only to the extent necessary to keep the working space comfortable and 
suitable for its designated purpose. Purchasers of lawn mowing services 
focus on the services and would generally show no interest in equipment 
used, as long as the end product is a beautifully cared for lawn. Tax law 
appears to recognize that distinction. 
Commentary generally would not express concern about the tax 
treatment of partners in property-services partnerships. In the case of 
Chrichel LLC, in particular, the income flowing to the parties is services 
income. The assets have little or no residual value, so the partners will 
recognize services income from the partnership. Such tax treatment 
generally appears to be innocuous. Perhaps commentators could express 
some concern that Lee has rental income instead of services income. 
Both types of income are subject to ordinary income rates.53 The bigger 
concern would be gain from the property allocated to Rex. That gain 
could qualify for the favorable long-term capital gains rate.54 The 
ordinary income rates paid on the rental income appear to appease 
commentators generally as the taxation of such interest appears to escape 
scrutiny, at least in the current debate. The discussion below explains 
why economics support the treatment.55 
  
 51  See id. § 701 (providing that partners shall be liable for tax on partnership income). 
 52 See id. § 61 (a)(1). 
 53 See, e.g., id. § 1(h). 
 54 See id. § 1231 (a) (providing that if section 1231 gains exceed section 1231 losses in a 
taxable year, the law shall treat such gains and losses as gains and losses from the sale of capital 
assets). If the property’s holding period exceeds one year, the gain could be long-term capital gain. 
See id. § 1222(3). 
 55 See infra text accompanying notes 132-139.  
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3. Investment Partnerships 
A third type of arrangement, the investment partnership, also 
appears to come within the definition of tax partnership.56 Assume 
Warbucks has $100 million he would like to put to good use (i.e., invest 
for a significant return). Assume further that Krinkle has a reputation of 
managing investments well, returns a good profit on invested money, and 
has access to other resources that help him manage capital. Warbucks 
and Krinkle agree to form a limited partnership (Kribucks LP) pursuant 
to which Warbucks will contribute $100 million and Krinkle will 
contribute investment services.57 The partnership agreement provides that 
the partnership will pay Krinkle $2 million upon formation as a fee for 
managing Kribucks LP and divide any profits from the partnership 80% 
to Warbucks and 20% to Krinkle.58 Partnership income will primarily 
derive from the property (i.e., dividends or interest) or gain from the sale 
of the property (i.e., investment income59), and Krinkle will limit his 
activities to making investment decisions and managing the investments. 
The arrangement appears to be a partnership because the parties integrate 
property and services and divide profits. The arrangement is an 
investment partnership. Although the analysis below suggests that 
investment partnerships should not come within the definition of tax 
partnership,60 the current definition probably includes them. 
The extent of Krinkle’s services should determine the character 
of gain that Kribucks LP will recognize on the disposition of the 
property. If Krinkle improves the property and actively markets the 
property, the gain will be from the disposition of dealer property and be 
subject to ordinary income rates.61 If, however, Krinkle merely selects 
investments that appreciate over time, gain on the disposition of the 
property will be capital gain and may qualify for long-term capital gain 
treatment.62 The difference between the two results is the primary source 
of income. If the primary source of income is Krinkle’s services (i.e., his 
efforts to improve and market the property or his actively trading the 
  
 56 See Rev. Rul. 75-523, 1975-2 C.B. 257 (ruling that an investment club that did not 
carry on a trade or business for section 162 purposes was a tax partnership). 
 57 This Article uses the term “investment services” to define those services that a taxpayer 
can perform without being deemed to carry on a trade or business for purposes of section 162. 
 58 This is an example of the traditional two and twenty carried interest structure that has 
received considerable recent attention. See Fleischer, supra note 17, at 8-15 (describing carried 
interests); supra notes 17-21 (citing articles that discuss the tax treatment of carried interests). 
 59 See I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(B) (defining investment income as income from property held 
for investment). 
 60 See infra Part IV.C. 
 61 Several cases hold that improvements and efforts to market make property dealer 
property subject to ordinary income rates. See, e.g., Major Realty Corp. v. Comm’r, 749 F.2d 1483, 
1488-89 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 906, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1969).  
 62 See, e.g., Williford v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 (1992) (holding that paintings 
acquired and held for investment were capital assets). 
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property), then Kribucks LP would have ordinary income.63 If, however, 
the primary source of income is the property’s appreciation, the income 
should be capital gain income.64 By definition, an investment 
partnership’s primary source of income must be property. If services 
contribute too significantly to the partnership’s income, the partnership 
will be a property-services or services partnership. 
The proper tax treatment of Krinkle is the source of the current 
contention regarding profits-only partnership interests. If Krinkle were to 
perform the same services as an employee of Warbucks, the income he 
received would be compensation, potentially taxed at thirty-five percent. 
If tax law respects the limited partnership, and the arrangement is an 
investment partnership, Krinkle will pay tax on the income at the 
favorable capital gain rate, which could be as low as fifteen percent. By 
changing the form of the arrangement, Warbucks and Krinkle are 
therefore able to significantly reduce Krinkle’s tax liability. That 
different tax treatment rightfully raises the ire of many commentators. 
The four hypothetical partnerships illustrate three general types 
of tax partnerships and provide a baseline for analyzing profits-only 
partnership interests. As the analysis proceeds, this Article will refer to 
the partnerships as follows: Jorah Law Firm, which integrates two 
parties’ services, is a services partnership. Leex Partnership and Chrichel 
LLC, which integrate one person’s property with the contributed services 
of at least one other person, are property-services partnerships. Kribucks 
LP, which appears to integrate property with limited investment services, 
is an investment partnership. Each type of partnership relies upon 
services and property to a different extent for profit. A pure-services 
partnership relies almost exclusively on partner services for profit. The 
property-services partnership relies on both property and services for 
profit. The investment partnership relies primarily on property for profit. 
B.   Types of Partnership Interests 
As stated above, a tax partnership requires two or more persons 
to integrate resources and share profits.65 The persons who integrate the 
resources and share profits are partners. For a person to be a partner in a 
tax partnership, the person must contribute property or services and must 
take a control interest in other property and services.66 Thus, the 
following descriptions of the various types of tax partnership interests 
  
 63 See supra note 61. 
 64 See supra note 62. Property held by a securities trader, however, is a capital asset, the 
gains and losses from which are capital in nature and may be subject to favorable rates or 
disallowed, even though the owners may be active in buying or selling securities. See Marrin v. 
Comm’r, 147 F.3d 147, 151-53 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that individuals were traders rather than 
dealers because they did not hold property for sale to customers as required in section 1221(1)). 
 65  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 66 The discussion below of the nature of tax partnerships considers these requirements. 
See infra text accompanying notes 84-88. 
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assume that the parties have made the requisite contributions and taken 
the requisite control interests to be partners. Generally, the determination 
of partner status should require significant analysis. As argued below, 
failure to give due regard to partner status causes many problems. Before 
considering those issues, consider the various types of partnership 
interests. 
A full understanding of profits-only partnership interests requires 
understanding the various types of partnership interests.  In the examples 
above, each partnership granted profits-only partnership interests.67 Leex 
Partnership also granted a capital-profits partnership interest, and 
Kribucks LP also granted a capital-only partnership interest. The 
following discussion describes each type of interest. 
1. Profits-Only Partnership Interests 
A profits-only partnership interest gives a partner a share of 
future partnership profits but no interest in partnership capital on the date 
of the grant.68 That definition has important implications. First, the holder 
of a profits-only partnership interest is a member of an arrangement that 
comes within the definition of tax partnership, which means the holder 
has the rights and powers of a partner. Second, at the time a tax 
partnership grants a profits-only partnership interest, the grantee does not 
have a right to any of the partnership capital.69 Third, the grantee of a 
profits-only partnership interest contributes only services to the 
partnership. This definition would include the interests Sarah and Joline 
take in Jorah Law Firm, the interest Lee takes in Leex Partnership, the 
interest Christy takes in Chrichel LLC, and the interest Krinkle takes in 
Kribucks LP. Each of these people contributes only services and has no 
right to a capital distribution immediately following partnership 
formation. Each of them is, however, a member of an arrangement that 
appears to come within the definition of tax partnership. Thus, their 
interests are profits-only partnership interests. 
  
 67 Another commentator referred to profits-only partnership interests as “naked profits 
interest[s].” See Laura E. Cunningham, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services, 47 
TAX L. REV. 247, 255 (1991). 
 68 Over time, if the partnership does not rule distributions, or if partnership property 
appreciates, the holder of a profits-only partnership interest may accrue an interest in partnership 
capital. Thus, the definition focuses on the rights on the day of grant. 
 69 This is consistent with the IRS’s definition of profits interest. The IRS defines a profits 
interest as any interest in a partnership “other than a capital interest.” See Rev. Proc. 93-27, § 2.02, 
1993-2 C.B. 343. The IRS defines capital interest in a partnership as “an interest that would give the 
holder a share of the proceeds if the partnership’s assets were sold at fair market value and then the 
proceeds were distributed in a complete liquidation of the partnership.” Id. § 2.01. The IRS generally 
determines whether a partnership interest is capital or profits at the time the partner receives the 
partnership interest. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2007) (providing that the 
timing of recognition of income on the transfer of a capital interest depends upon whether the service 
provider has provided the services and whether the transfer is conditioned upon rendering services). 
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The interest Krinkle takes in Kribucks LP is, more particularly, a 
carried interest.70 Carried interests have captured the attention of the legal 
academy,71 tax bar,72 and Congress.73 The typical carried interest is a bit 
more complicated than the example. Generally, a carried interest will 
first ensure that the capital contributor receives eighty percent of the first 
ten percent return (i.e., eight percent) of the return on the capital (“the 
hurdle rate”).74 Once the capital contributor receives that eight percent, 
the service provider receives the next two percent of return and the 
parties share any other return in an eighty-twenty split. The service 
provider’s interest is a carried interest. Despite the complexity, a carried 
interest is an interest in the profits of the arrangement. It is merely a form 
of profits-only partnership interest. Instead of raising unique tax issues, it 
brought to the attention of the public the inequity of the tax treatment of 
profits-only partnership interests. Professor Fleischer is largely 
responsible for notifying the public of the problem.75 
2. Capital-Only Partnership Interests 
A capital-only partnership interest is an interest granted to a 
person who contributes only property to a tax partnership.76 The interest 
Warbucks takes in Kribucks LP is an example of a capital-only 
partnership interest. Warbucks contributed only property to Kribucks LP. 
He will share in the partnership profit, but he will not provide services. If 
the partnership liquidated immediately following formation, as the sole 
contributor of capital, Warbucks would receive all of the partnership 
capital.77 For the same reasons, Rachel also takes a capital-only 
partnership interest in Chrichel LLC.  
3. Capital-Profits Partnership Interests 
Capital-profits partnership interests are similar to profits-only 
partnership interests in some respects and similar to capital-only 
partnership interests in other respects. The interest Rex takes in Leex 
  
 70 See Fleischer, supra note 17, at 8-15 (describing carried interests). 
 71 See supra note 17. 
 72 See supra note 21. 
 73 See supra note 16. 
 74 See Weisbach, supra note 20, at 722. 
 75  See Fleischer, supra note 17, at 8-16. 
 76 This definition is consistent with the IRS’s definition of capital interest. See Rev. Proc. 
93-27 § 2.01, 1993-2 C.B. 343 (“A capital interest is an interest that would give the holder a share of 
the proceeds if the partnership’s assets were sold at fair market value and then the proceeds were 
distributed in a complete liquidation of the partnership.”). This Article uses the more specific term 
“capital-only partnership interests” to facilitate the distinction of such interests from capital-profits 
partnership interests. 
 77  This assumes that the partnership liquidates in accordance with positive capital 
account balances as required by the economic effect safe harbor. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2) (as amended in 2008). 
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Partnership has aspects of a profits-only partnership interest because the 
profit allocation agreement undoubtedly is based in part on the services 
Rex will contribute. Rex also contributed property, so he will have a 
capital interest (i.e., a right to a capital distribution if the partnership 
liquidated immediately following formation) in Leex Partnership at the 
time of formation. Thus, Rex’s interest in Leex Partnership is a 
combination of both a capital-only partnership interest and a profits-only 
partnership interest. Because of the similarity to both types of interests, 
the interest is a capital-profits partnership interest.  
Partnership tax policy generally supports the tax-free formation 
of partnerships and the tax-free admission of new partners to existing 
partnerships.78 The grant of an interest in partnership capital to a service 
contributor is not, however, a tax-free transaction. The service 
contributor will generally have compensation income on the date of the 
grant of the capital interest.79 With few exceptions, the IRS does not 
challenge the tax-free grant of a profits-only partnership interest to a 
service contributor.80 Instead, holders of profits-only partnership interests 
recognize income as it flows through from the partnership and take the 
character of such income as determined at the partnership level. 
Even though partnerships can grant different types of partnership 
interests, most commentary regarding taxation of partners on a 
partnership formation focuses on the tax consequences of the grantee of 
profits-only partnership interests. The recent debate more particularly 
concerns the tax treatment of profits-only partnership interests in 
investment partnerships.81 Compensation proponents argue that grantees 
of profits-only partnership interests have compensation either at the time 
the partnership grants the interests or over time as the partnership 
allocates or distributes profits to the grantees.82 Compensation 
proponents recommend partnership disaggregation as a way to alter the 
character of income flowing from an investment partnership to holders of 
profits-only partnership interests. The nature of partnerships, however, 
makes partnership disaggregation an unsuitable remedy for the 
intellectual discomfort the taxation of profits-only partnership interests 
cause. 
  
 78 See I.R.C. § 721 (2006). 
 79 See MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 35, ¶ 5.03[1]. 
 80 See Rev. Proc. 93-27 § 4, 1993-2 C.B. 343. 
 81 The taxation of profits-only partnership interests in services partnerships is not as 
significant a concern because the character of income that flows through to the partners is income 
from services. See supra text accompanying note 47. The same is true for income from property-
services partnerships that have services income. The issue with profits-only partnership interests is 
the timing of income recognition, which is discussed infra text accompanying notes 224-228. 
 82 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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C.   Nature of Tax Partnerships 
Tax partnerships are unique arrangements and deserve analysis 
independent of that applied to other business arrangements. The defining 
attributes of tax partnerships are integration of services and property (or 
the services of at least two people) and allocation of economic items.83 
Parties integrate to reduce appropriable quasi rents,84 and they allocate 
the economic items of an arrangement to reduce agency costs.85 
Integrating services and property gives the service contributor and 
property contributor an interest in both the partnership property and 
partnership services. The property owner commits the property to 
partnership use. Thus, although the service contributor would not receive 
a share of the property upon liquidation of the partnership immediately 
following formation, the service contributor participates in directing the 
use of the property and shares any increase in the property’s value and its 
product. Participating in the control of property distinguishes a partner 
from an employee.86 In particular, an employee does not share in the 
control of all aspects of property not contracted away (i.e., the property’s 
residual claim).87 The control of such aspects of property is the property’s 
residual claim.88 A service provider who shares the residual claim of 
property becomes a partner to the property owner, if the property owner 
gains adequate control of the contributed services.  
Partners also take an interest in contributed services. The 
Thirteenth Amendment generally prohibits control of another individual, 
implying that the product of an individual’s labor should belong to the 
individual.89 Nonetheless, individuals should be able to transfer the 
  
 83 See Borden, supra note 24, 744-61 (describing the nature of partnerships and the use 
of allocations to control agency costs); Schmolka, supra note 20, at 297-99 (recognizing the unique 
nature of partnerships as mini-exchanges between the partnership as the partnership conducts 
business and each mini-exchange is taxed as the partnership allocates tax items to partners under 
subchapter K).  
 84 See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 2, at 298. 
 85 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 4, at 786. 
 86 See, e.g., Fishback v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 621, 626 (D.S.D. 1963) (finding that 
parties were joint proprietors and holding that arrangement was a tax partnership); Copeland v. 
Ratterree, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9895, at 58,195-96 (N.D.N.Y. 1957) (holding no partnership 
existed even though parties shared profits because they did not share control); Luna v. Comm’r, 42 
T.C. 1067, 1077-78 (1964) (considering whether the parties shared control and responsibilities of the 
enterprise in holding that no partnership existed); Beck Chem. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 27 T.C. 840, 
854 (1957) (finding that the parties had mutual proprietary interest in profits and holding that 
arrangement was a tax partnership). 
 87 See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1119, 1121 (1990) (“We suppose that the sole right possessed by the owner of an asset is his 
ability to exclude others from the use of that asset.”). 
 88 See Grossman & Hart, supra note 39, at 695 (defining residual rights of control (i.e., 
residual claim) as “the right to control all aspects of the asset that have not been explicitly given 
away by contract”). 
 89 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. This is consistent with John Locke’s understanding of 
the product of labor as property. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27, at 305-
06 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (“Though the Earth, and all inferior 
Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body 
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product of their labor to others, and thereby grant to others a share of the 
residual claim of particular services.90 By contributing services to a 
partnership, a service provider grants the other partners a share of the 
residual claim in the contributed services. Thus, partners become residual 
claimants, or co-owners, of partnership property and services. 
The co-ownership of partnership property and services makes 
tracing income from either the contributed property or services to the 
contributor impossible. A tax partnership’s income flows from the 
combined output of partnership property and services, over both of 
which the partners share control. Sharing control and the residual claims 
of integrated property and services gives partnerships their distinctive 
nature. In particular, the parties cannot trace income from its source to a 
single owner of the source. Consider the nature of the various types of 
partnerships using these concepts.  
Joline and Sarah each contribute services to Jorah Law Firm. If 
Joline brings in a new client matter and Sarah works on the matter, the 
partners cannot separate client-origination income from legal-services 
income when deciding how to divide the profit from the matter.91 They 
have agreed, however, to divide the profit from that matter 60% to Joline 
and 40% to Sarah. Both the origination and legal work are required for 
the matter to create profit. As partners, Joline and Sarah share control of 
the origination and legal work and share in the profits from the integrated 
services. They cannot trace the profits directly or accurately from the 
exact source, so their agreed allocation determines each partner’s share 
of income for client work Joline originates.92  
The nature of partnerships also manifests itself in property-
services partnerships. The income from Leex Partnership flows from 
  
has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are 
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature has provided, and left it in, he 
hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this Labour 
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the 
unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned 
to, at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others.”). 
 90 Although parties may not compel others to act, after contracting to receive services, a 
party may receive damages from and perhaps impose an injunction on the party who fails to provide 
the contracted services. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.5, at 745 (4th ed. 2004). 
Thus, by entering into a contract, a service provider may transfer the product of labor to another 
party. 
 91 Law firms may routinely allocate a share of profits from a matter to the originating 
partner to recognize the importance of origination. Such allocation does not necessarily reflect the 
source of income, but may merely reflect the law firms’ perceived importance of rainmaking. The 
profit allocation to the originator is a form of monitoring that helps discourage shirking. See Borden, 
supra note 24, at 752-61 (describing how partners might allocate partnership profits to reduce 
shirking and agency costs). 
 92 The allocation of economic items distinguishes tax partnerships from other integrated 
arrangements. All of the legal forms that can come within the definition of tax partnerships allow 
their members to allocate economic items by agreement. Corporations do not grant such rights. 
Thus, the integration of property and services and the legal right to allocate economic items define 
the nature of tax partnerships. 
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both the property Rex contributes and the services Rex and Lee 
contribute. The partners cannot separately trace income from property 
and services.93 The income from one source fuses with the income from 
the other source.94 The income from the combined sources becomes 
partnership income and flows to the partners with the character 
determined at the partnership level. Thus, the income from Rex’s and 
Lee’s contributed services and Rex’s contributed property becomes 
rental income. Gain or loss from the sale of the office building should be 
gain or loss from the sale of a section 1231 asset.95 The amount of gain 
recognized after formation will depend on both the contributed property 
and the contributed services.96 The inability to trace income from services 
contributed by the service provider and property contributed by a 
property owner distinguishes integrated arrangements from nonintegrated 
arrangements.97  
A profits-only partnership interest grants the owner of such 
interest a right to a portion of the income from the combined property 
and services of the partnership. The income does not merely flow from 
the service provider’s services. The income also flows from the property 
in which the service provider takes an interest as a partner. Similarly, 
because a property contributor takes an interest in the service provider’s 
services, income allocated to the property contributor includes income 
from property and services. Furthermore, the combination of the 
contributions should create output that exceeds the sum of the output of 
the contributions working separately.98 Partners take an interest in that 
excess which does separately trace from either the property or services. 
The partners’ interests in the product of all contributed resources give tax 
partnerships their unique nature. Because both parties co-own the 
resources needed to generate the rental income or gain from sale of a 
section 1231 asset and cannot trace income directly from the respective 
contributions, they both recognize the income in the character it takes at 
the partnership level. 
  
 93 See Borden, supra note 34, at 1024-25 (providing that the inability to trace from 
arrangements that combine property and services justifies the use of the partnership tax accounting 
and reporting rules). 
 94 The property’s location, size of units, and accessibility will affect rental income, as 
will Rex and Lee’s management services. See JOHN MCMAHAN, THE HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL 
REAL ESTATE INVESTING 5-21 (2006). There is no way to determine the extent to which income 
derives from either the property or the services.  
 95 See I.R.C. § 1231 (2006). 
 96 As with the source of rental income, the parties cannot exactly determine the extent to 
which property and services independently affect the value of the property. The property’s location, 
market factors, and other development will affect its value, as will Rex’s and Lee’s efforts to 
maintain, improve, and lease the property. See MCMAHAN, supra note 94, at 5-21. There is simply 
no way to determine the extent to which the value of the property derives from either source. 
 97 See Borden, supra note 24, at 752-61 (discussing the nature of partnerships and the 
inability to trace income from the contributed source). 
 98 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972). 
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Investment partnerships differ, however, from services 
partnerships and property-services partnerships in one potentially 
significant aspect—by definition, the level of services contributed to an 
investment partnership is nominal.99 The sale of an investment 
partnership’s assets generates capital gain or loss, which means tax law 
treats the income as derived almost exclusively from the property, not 
services.100 The implication is that the services do not contribute to the 
profits of the partnership. Because the income derives from the property, 
the partners should be able to trace the partnership income from its 
source to the owners of the property.101 For example, assume two persons 
contribute equally to a limited liability company that acquires raw land, 
which the company leases to a cattle rancher. The company provides no 
services with respect to the land. Because the limited liability company 
only has income from the land, it should be able to trace that income 
from the land directly to the members based upon their contributions. 
The ability to trace the income from the source makes the arrangement 
look less like a partnership—at a minimum, investment partnerships lack 
the unique inability-to-trace attribute of both services partnerships and 
property-services partnerships.102  
Partnership tax law recognizes the inability to trace partnership 
income from its source and allows partners to allocate partnership tax 
items in any reasonable manner. Normally any income from the property 
should be income to the property owner and income from services should 
be income to the service provider.103 Tax law cannot impose that rule in 
  
 99 See supra text accompanying notes 61-64. 
 100 Courts look to taxpayers’ efforts in determining whether an asset is a capital asset or 
an asset that generates ordinary income upon sale. See, e.g., Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 
526 F.2d 409, 423 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that efforts to develop, frequency of sales, and other 
taxpayer efforts demonstrated the taxpayer held the property primarily for sale and gain on sale was 
ordinary income); Hansche v. Comm’r, 457 F.2d 429, 434-35 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the 
property’s value increased because of taxpayer’s efforts and property was not capital asset); see also 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What’s Law Got to Do with It?, 39 
SW. L.J. 869, 890 (1985) (“The distinction between investor and businessman is critical here, as it 
was in Britain, because the former held his capital to produce income in the form of rents, dividends, 
or interest; the latter used his capital to buy and sell assets such that the act of buying and selling 
produced income in the form of the gains realized from the increased value.”).  
 101 See Bradley T. Borden, Policy and Theoretical Dimensions of Qualified Tax 
Partnerships, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 317, 360 (2008) (arguing that investment qualified tax 
partnerships should not come within the definition of tax partnerships because they do not need the 
partnership allocation rules); Borden, supra note 34, at 1014 (“Members of [investment partnerships] 
can trace income from the property directly to the owners based on the owners’ respective ownership 
interests in the property. Thus, the arrangements do not need the partnership accounting and 
reporting rules or the allocation rules.”). 
 102 The legislation proposed to change the tax treatment of carried interests recognized the 
distinction and limited the scope of the proposed rule to investment partnerships. See Temporary Tax 
Relief Act of 2007, H.R. 3996, 110th Cong. § 710(c) (as passed by House, Nov. 9, 2007) (limiting 
the scope of the recharacterization of income to services provided with respect to specified assets, 
which include only securities, real estate, commodities, and options or derivatives in such assets). 
 103 See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114, 119-20 (1940) (holding that a property 
owner could not assign income from the property); Lucas v. Earl 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930) 
(holding that an employee could not assign compensation to his spouse). 
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the partnership context because it cannot trace income from property and 
services. The allocation rules are, therefore, a compromise between the 
assignment-of-income doctrine and the inability to trace.104 They should, 
however, be reserved only for arrangements that create tracing 
difficulty.105 Services partnerships and property-services partnerships 
both present tracing difficulty; investments partnerships, lacking the 
unique character of partnerships, do not. Thus, investment partnerships 
do not appear to require the partnership tax allocation rules like other 
partnerships do. The proper way to address that difference may be to 
disregard investment partnerships.106 Nonetheless, many 
recommendations regarding profits-only interests reform generally have 
been to disaggregate investment partnerships to cure the ill affects they 
cause. The byproduct of attempted investment partnership disaggregation 
has been complexity and a proposed law that would breach the integrity 
of subchapter K and adversely affect the application of other tax 
provisions.  
III. PARTNERSHIP DISAGGREGATION 
Most commentary regarding profits-only partnership interests 
assumes the arrangements are tax partnerships and proceeds from that 
premise.107 For the sake of analysis, the following discussion of 
partnership disaggregation accepts the assumption. In Part IV, this 
Article demonstrates that the assumption may be unfounded in many 
situations and that many arrangements should not come within the 
definition of tax partnership. Instead, they should be disregarded.  
Assuming that an arrangement is a tax partnership, partnership 
disaggregation will not properly tax profits-only partnership interests. 
Partnership tax law provides generally that partnerships compute taxable 
income and allocate it to their partners who pay tax on the tax 
partnership income.108 The character of income at the partnership level 
flows through to the partners.109 Thus, if a tax partnership has long-term 
capital gain on the sale of an asset, it would allocate that gain to its 
partners, each of whom would individually report the income as long-
  
 104 See Borden, supra note 47, at 333-46 (explaining the difficulties that inability-to-trace 
presents); Borden, supra note 34, at 951-56 (describing relationship between the assignment-of-
income doctrine and the partnership allocation rules). 
 105 See Borden, supra note 47, at 338-44 (identifying potentially abusive uses of the 
allocation rules). 
 106 See infra Part IV.C (suggesting the definition of tax partnership should not include 
investment partnerships). 
 107 See supra commentary cited in notes 17-21; see also Weisbach, supra note 20, at 719 
(“Private equity sponsors, however, are central to the partnership activity. They are the managers of 
the partnership, making all of the investment decisions. Viewing them as anything other than 
partners would require reexamining this basic premise of partnership taxation, a premise that has 
underscored partnership taxation for more than fifty years.”). 
 108 See I.R.C. §§ 701-704 (2006). 
 109 See id. § 702(b). 
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term capital gain. Similarly, income from tax partnership services would 
flow through to the partners as income from services. The rules do not 
consider the separate activities of the partners or what they contribute in 
applying the character-flow-through rule. 
Partnership disaggregation alters the character of partnership 
income as it flows from the tax partnership to partners. Thus, partnership 
disaggregation might change income that is long-term capital gain at the 
partnership level to compensation at the partner level. Compensation 
proponents recommend partnership disaggregation as the appropriate 
method for determining the taxation of profits-only partnership 
interests.110 They use two primary analytical methods to support 
disaggregation in the case of income allocated to holders of profits-only 
partnership interests: (1) a partner-shareholder comparison and (2) a 
contribution-focused analysis. Each method has serious weaknesses and 
presents tax policy concerns. Furthermore, partnership disaggregation 
would cause complexities and difficulties that affect more than 
partnership taxation and could outweigh possible benefits. 
A.   Partner-Shareholder Comparison 
The partner-shareholder comparison is a horizontal equity 
analysis. The comparison reasons that service-contributing partners are 
similar to service-providing shareholders and should therefore be taxed 
similarly.111 That analysis appears to follow horizontal equity, which 
requires tax law to treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly.112 
Convincing horizontal equity arguments are difficult to make, however, 
because all taxpayers are alike in some respects and different in some 
respects.113 Whether two persons are alike depends upon the criteria used 
  
 110 See, e.g., Noël B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried Interest 
Controversy: Let’s Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAX L. REV. 121, 125-42 (2008) (describing the 
ordinary-income and imputed-interest approaches to disaggregation). 
 111 See Fleischer, supra note 17, at 32-33. 
 112 See A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 5 (3d rev. ed. 1962) (stating that 
“similar persons should be treated similarly”) (emphasis omitted); accord HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED 
GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 367 (8th ed. 2008) (“People in equal positions should be treated equally.”); 
Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 113 (1990) (describing 
horizontal equity as “requiring equal treatment of equals”). 
 113 See J.R. Lucas, Vive la Difference, 53 PHIL. 363, 363-64 (1978) (“Men are all alike . . . 
Men are all different. We are all alike in being featherless bipeds, language-using animals, sentient 
beings, centres of consciousness, and, granted certain conditions of age and health, rational agents. 
Each of us is different in spatio-temporal location, and, identical twins apart, in his genetic 
inheritance and the detailed biochemistry of his body; and, at a more conceptual level, in as much as 
each has a mind of his own, and can make up his mind for himself, and can make it up differently 
from anyone else.”). Some commentators dismiss horizontal equity as being tautological and 
therefore of little analytical value. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 537, 547-48 (1982) (“Equality is an undeniable and unchangeable moral truth because it is a 
simple tautology.”). Nonetheless, it is a powerful analytical tool, and even critics find themselves 
relying upon it to support positions. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 20, at 740-41 (criticizing 
horizontal equity); id. at 752 (using horizontal equity analysis to argue that private equity sponsors 
should be treated like investors). Because horizontal equity is so tempting to use and so powerful, 
 
2009] PROFITS-ONLY INTERESTS 1305 
 
for comparison.114 Thus, the starting point of a horizontal equity analysis 
is determining the proper criteria to use as a point of comparison.  
The criteria used in the partner-shareholder comparison are (1) 
the provision of services and (2) the receipt of an interest in an entity.115 
The comparison begins by considering the receipt of corporate stock for 
services. A service-providing shareholder provides services and receives 
an interest in a corporation. A service-providing shareholder must 
recognize the grant of compensatory corporate interest as income.116 The 
analysis recognizes that a service-providing partner similarly provides 
services and takes partnership interests. The partner-shareholder 
comparison therefore suggests that a grantee of a profits-only partnership 
interest should be taxed like the service-providing shareholder. The 
analysis then suggests that the grantee of a profits-only partnership 
interest should recognize compensation income as a result of a grant of a 
profits-only partnership interest.117 The criteria used in the partner-
shareholder analysis make the analysis attractive but ultimately 
ineffective because partnerships and corporations are distinctly different. 
Comparing members of tax partnerships to shareholders for 
income tax purposes is often the proverbial comparison of apples to 
oranges. A very significant attribute distinguishes partnerships from 
corporations and is relevant to the analysis of the taxation of profits-only 
partnership interests. In particular, the basic organizational structure of a 
corporation differs from a partnership’s organizational structure. 
Corporations grant shareholders the right to elect a board of directors.118 
The board of directors appoints officers to manage the corporation.119 A 
corporate board of directors may appoint a shareholder to be an officer, 
and a corporation may grant equity interests to corporate employees.120 
Thus, an individual may be both a shareholder and employee of a 
corporation. A shareholder generally may not, however, act on behalf of 
  
the focus should be on the criteria of comparison and establishing standards that will help formulate 
the best possible criteria.  
 114 See Kent Greenwalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 
1178 (1983) (“In order to decide what persons are relevantly equal or unequal, substantive 
judgments have to be made about what characteristics count.”). Depending upon the criteria used, 
the outcomes of horizontal analysis may vary significantly. See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, The Like-
Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum, 60 FLA. L. REV. 643, 672-82 (2008) (providing examples of 
different outcomes depending on the criteria used to apply a horizontal equity analysis to section 
1031 nonrecognition treatment of like-kind exchanges). 
 115  See Fleischer, supra note 17, at 25-26. 
 116 See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2006). 
 117 See Cunningham, supra note 67, at 268. 
 118 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28 (1984); 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.28 
(4th ed. 2008). 
 119 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40 (1984); 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.40 
(4th ed. 2008). 
 120 See generally Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee 
Stock-Based Compensation, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1421 (2007) (discussing the use of stock to 
compensate corporate employees). 
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the corporation in the capacity of a shareholder.121 Individuals act on 
behalf of a corporation in the capacity of corporate employee or 
independent contractor.122 Consequently, any property that a shareholder 
receives from a corporation in exchange for services will be 
compensation from acting as a corporate employee, not as a shareholder. 
Taxing the grant of corporate stock to a service provider as compensation 
is therefore appropriate. 
Partners, on the other hand, may act on behalf of a partnership in 
either a partner or nonpartner capacity.123 The same is true for members 
of member-managed limited liability companies.124 That distinction 
undermines the comparison of partners and shareholders. A partner’s 
ability to act in a partner capacity often makes comparing a partner to a 
sole proprietor more appropriate than comparing a partner to a corporate 
employee.125 A sole proprietor acts in the capacity of a sole proprietor, 
not in the capacity of an employee of the proprietorship. A sole 
proprietor who provides services to others generates services income. A 
sole proprietor may also acquire rental property and perform only tenant 
services with respect to such property, which would generate rental 
income for the sole proprietor.126 A sole proprietor also may acquire and 
  
 121 In limited situations, a shareholder may bring a derivative suit on behalf of the 
corporation. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.40-.41 (1984); 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION 
ACT. ANNOTATED §§ 7.40-.41(4th ed. 2008) (discussing shareholder derivative suits). If, however, 
the corporation commences an inquiry into the matter, a court may stay a derivative proceeding. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.43 (1984); 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.43 (4th ed. 2008). 
 122 Although the distinction between employee and independent contractor is often 
important, in this analysis, it is not relevant. Any property an independent contractor receives in 
exchange for providing services will be compensation to the independent contractor. 
 123 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301(1) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 101 (2001) (providing that 
each partner is an agent of the partnership); UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 402(a) (2001), 6A U.L.A. 429 
(2008) (providing that a general partner is an agent of a limited partnership). The distinction between 
a partner as a partner and partner as an employee has recently been the topic of considerable debate. 
See generally Robert W. Hillman, Law, Culture, and the Lore of Partnership: Of Entrepreneurs, 
Accountability, and the Evolving Status of Partners, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2005) 
(recognizing the significant changes in business practices and suggesting that such changes should 
affect the concept of partner and employee); Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? 
Partners and Shareholders as “Employees” Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 3 
(2004) (analyzing the distinction between partner and employee in employment discrimination cases, 
discussing case law that has held that partners can be employees, and suggesting principles that 
should govern the distinction between partner and employee). 
 124 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(a) (1996), 6B U.L.A. 585 (2008) (providing that 
members are agents of the limited liability company). Manager-managed limited liability companies 
may be more similar to corporations for the sake of this analysis. That being the case, a limited 
liability company interest transferred to a member of a manager-managed limited liability company 
may be compensation to the recipient. Such a transfer may be indicative of the member acting in a 
nonpartner capacity, as discussed below, and should be taxed accordingly. These issues deserve 
greater scrutiny in an effort to better develop the distinction between partners acting in partner and 
nonpartner capacities. 
 125 Others have made this comparison. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 67, at 256-57 
(“An individual conducting business as a partnership should not be taxed less favorably than he 
would be if he were conducting business as a sole proprietor . . . .”); Weisbach, supra note 20, at 752 
(arguing that tax law should treat a private equity sponsor like an individual investor). 
 126 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (2006). 
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hold investment property (i.e., a capital asset).127 Too much activity on 
the part of the sole proprietor with respect to investment property will 
convert it to property that produces ordinary income.128 Otherwise, 
income from such property will be investment income. Thus, not all 
income derived from a sole proprietor’s services is compensation. Tax 
law characterizes income derived from a sole proprietor’s services 
depending upon the comparative levels of involvement of the property 
and services in creating the income.129 
Because partners can act in a partner capacity, tax law should 
treat them more like sole proprietors who act in their individual 
capacities. Partners acting on behalf of partnerships may generate 
partnership services income or partnership investment income. The 
distinction, however, should depend upon the level of activity performed 
at the partnership level. Partners who act on behalf of an investment 
partnership perform nominal services.130 The nominal services do not 
convert the partnership income to services income. The service 
provider’s services are so limited in nature that the partnership remains 
an investment partnership. Altering the character of income as it flows 
from the partnership to the partner would create services income where 
none may otherwise be present.131  
The economic nature of tax partnerships and corporations also 
varies significantly, and partner-shareholder comparisons fail to 
distinguish between the various types of partnerships. Recall from the 
discussion above that the allocation of economic items distinguishes tax 
partnerships from other arrangements.132 Because a corporation cannot 
allocate economic items, any payments from a corporation to a 
shareholder that are not made with respect to stock (i.e., a dividend) must 
be compensation. If such payments are in the form of stock, a service-
providing shareholder could avoid services income. The service provider 
would take a zero basis in the stock, which would be a capital asset.133 
The stock may have value upon the date of receipt, so not taxing the 
  
 127 See id. § 1221 (defining capital asset). 
 128 See supra note 100. 
 129 Tax law allows a property owner to perform some services that improve the property’s 
value without affecting the property’s capital asset status See, e.g., Barrios Estate v. Comm’r, 265 
F.2d 517, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1959). If the services become too extensive, the property converts to 
dealer property and gain from the sale of such property becomes ordinary income. See, e.g., Sanders 
v. United States, 740 F.2d 886, 888-89 (11th Cir. 1984). The line separating services allowed on 
investment property and services that create dealer property is unclear. This presents another area of 
the law ripe for consideration using modern analytical methods. 
 130 See supra text accompanying notes 57-64. 
 131 Income from a services partnership will not, however, be treated as services income 
for self-employment tax purposes if allocated to a limited partner who does not provide services. See 
I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13). For income tax purposes, it will, however, retain the character derived from the 
partnership and be service income to the limited partner. See id. § 702(b). 
 132 See supra text accompanying notes 83-85. 
 133 See I.R.C. § 1221 (defining corporate stock as a capital asset in the negative by not 
listing it among the type of property that does not come within the definition of capital asset). 
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receipt would defer the income and change its character. Any increase in 
the value of stock following the date of receipt would accrue to the 
service provider as capital gain, regardless of the character of income at 
the corporate level. If the corporation were to liquidate, the service 
provider would recognize capital gain to the extent the liquidating 
distribution exceeded the basis the shareholder had in the stock.134 
Similarly, the shareholder would recognize capital gain by selling the 
stock.  
That result would obtain regardless of the corporation’s 
enterprise. To illustrate, assume that Rex and Lee decide to form a 
corporation instead of a tax partnership.135 Rex contributes the office 
building to the corporation in exchange for stock, and the corporation 
distributes stock to Lee in exchange for the services he will provide.136 
Over the life of the corporation, it has rental income, and, if it ever 
disposes of the office building, it will have section 1231 gain.137 If the 
law did not tax Lee on the receipt of the corporate stock, he would have 
converted an entire stream of rental income (taxed at higher ordinary 
income rates) to capital gains, which may qualify for favorable tax rates. 
By taxing Lee on the receipt of the corporate stock, the law recognizes 
the potential for converting ordinary income into capital gain income and 
prevents such conversion. Furthermore, as a shareholder, Lee becomes a 
residual claimant of the corporation.138 Thus, the value of the stock on the 
date of issue represents the present value of the future stream of rental 
income and Lee’s residual claim in the building. Any increase in the 
value of Lee’s stock will reflect an increase in the value of the office 
building. Refuting the validity of that result is difficult.139 
  
 134 See id. § 302(a), (b)(3) (providing that payment in complete redemption of stock shall 
be treated as full payment in exchange for the stock). 
 135 See supra Part II.A.2. (presenting the facts of the hypothetical Leex Partnership). 
 136 Because Rex also agrees to contribute services, see supra Part II.A.2., a portion of the 
stock he receives will be compensation for those services and Rex will have to recognize 
compensation income upon receipt of the portion of the stock transferred in exchange for his 
services. See I.R.C. § 83(a). 
 137 See id. § 1231(a)(A). 
 138 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 
J. LAW & ECON. 327, 328 (1983) (introducing the discussion of unrestricted residual claims of open 
corporation common stock). 
 139 The one aspect of the result that is refutable is the double tax on corporations. The 
corporation will pay tax on the rental income, even though Lee will not. See I.R.C. § 11(a). As stated 
in the text, the value of the stock upon the date Lee receives it includes the present value of future 
rental income. Because the law requires Lee to pay tax on that amount and also requires the 
corporation to pay tax on the rental income, the law taxes the rental income twice. Commentators 
have criticized the double tax on corporations and have recommended changes that would help 
eliminate it. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, 2007 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 114-42 (Jun. 1, 2007) (proposing elimination of the double tax on corporate 
shareholders). Those arguments are convincing and deserve greater attention from lawmakers. If 
corporate tax were integrated, the law would either have to eliminate that tax on Lee at the time he 
receives the stock, or it would have to eliminate the corporate tax on rental income. That aspect of 
tax policy does not, however, affect the residual-risk distinction between tax partnerships and tax 
corporations. See Bradley T. Borden, Residual-Risk Model for Classifying Tax Entities, 37 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
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The flow-through nature of partnerships distinguishes them from 
corporations. Whereas Lee would not recognize any of the corporate 
income, if he were a shareholder, Lee would recognize his share of 
partnership income as the partnership allocates the income to him.140 
Thus, as the partnership has rental income, Lee will recognize rental 
income. He cannot convert that rental income into capital gain as a 
member of a partnership. Because Lee’s interest in the partnership is a 
profits-only interest, he does not take any interest in the value of the 
office building at the time of formation. Instead, his interest in the office 
building is limited to the office building’s future increase in value. Any 
portion of the gain allocated to him upon sale of the office building will 
be section 1231 gain, eligible for favorable capital gain rates.141 That 
amount of gain is similar to the capital gain reflected in the increase of 
stock that a service provider recognizes as corporate assets increase in 
value. Because Lee would recognize ordinary income as the partnership 
allocates rental income to him, a partnership is fundamentally different 
from a corporation. That difference warrants treating the grant of a 
profits-only interest differently from the grant of corporate stock in 
exchange for services. 
The analysis withstands scrutiny even in the case of an 
investment partnership. Whereas a service provider would pay tax on 
compensation for services if performed for a property owner,142 a partner 
who provides those same services could convert compensation income to 
capital gain. Thus, Krinkle and Warbucks can convert what would 
otherwise be compensation income into capital gain by creating Kribucks 
LP instead of entering into an employment arrangement.  
The partnership form thus allows Krinkle to defer recognition, as 
he would be able to do as an employee, but it also allows him to change 
the character of the income. Policy justifies the deferral because as a 
profits-only partner, Krinkle’s interest in the property accrues as the 
property’s value increases. Krinkle does not take an interest in the 
present value of the property. If Warbucks and Krinkle had instead 
formed a corporation, Krinkle would recognize compensation income 
upon receipt of his share of the stock. The value of the stock would 
represent Krinkle’s share of the residual value of the property that 
Warbucks would contribute to the corporation. Having received the stock 
in exchange for services, Krinkle would recognize the value of such 
stock as compensation income.143 The corporate form is different from 
the employment arrangement and tax partnership because as a 
shareholder, Krinkle takes an interest in the property at the time of 
corporate formation. As an employee or profits-only partner, Krinkle’s 
  
 140 See I.R.C. §§ 701, 704. 
 141  See id. § 1231(a). 
 142 See id. § 61(a)(1). 
 143 See id. § 83(a).  
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interest is limited to a share of the property’s future appreciation. That 
distinction indicates that a profits-only partner of an investment 
partnership should not be taxed like a shareholder. The profits-only 
partner of an investment partnership should instead be taxed like an 
individual. 
In the case of services partnerships or property-services 
partnerships, the grantee of a profits-only partnership interest will 
recognize ordinary income as the partnership allocates income to the 
partners. Thus, tax policy justifies deferring gain recognition until that 
time and allowing the character to flow from the partnership to the 
partners. The situation changes, however, in the case of an investment 
partnership that does not have ordinary income. The comparison of 
profits-only partners to individuals suggests that the services partner 
should have compensation income for the services provided. 
Compensation proponents suggest partnership disaggregation is the 
correct way to ensure that a profits-only partner of an investment 
partnership recognizes compensation. As demonstrated below, however, 
partnership disregard accomplishes these policy objectives without 
adverse consequences.144   
The allocation of economic items and the inability to trace them 
from their sources suggests that tax law should treat allocations to 
partners differently than it treats payments to shareholders. Even though 
a tax partnership integrates property and services, and thus is 
significantly different than an individual, the allocation of economic 
items from a partnership makes the comparison to an individual superior. 
Therefore, a horizontal equity analysis should not compare service-
contributing partners to service-providing shareholders. A horizontal 
equity analysis more appropriately compares service-contributing 
partners to sole proprietors and employees. 
B.   Contribution-Focused Analysis 
Compensation proponents also rely upon a contribution-focused 
analysis to argue for partnership disaggregation. A contribution-focused 
analysis considers what a partner contributes to a partnership to 
determine the character of income allocated to a partner.145 Under a 
contribution-focused analysis, partnership income allocated to a service 
contributor would be income from services; partnership income allocated 
to a property contributor would be income from property. Most 
applications of contribution-focused analysis focus on service 
contributions. If applied at all, a contribution-focused analysis should 
  
 144 See infra Part IV. 
 145  The commentators who suggest that service partners should recognize ordinary 
income from partnerships focus on the partners’ contributions. See generally sources cited supra 
note 17. 
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apply to all contributions, so any analysis that focuses solely on 
contributed services is incomplete. Changing the character of income to 
reflect contributed resources will, however, produce results that are 
difficult to justify.  
Leex Partnership helps illustrate how a fully functioning 
contribution-focused analysis should work. Recall that the Leex 
Partnership agreement provided that Rex would contribute both property 
and services.146 Under a contribution-focused analysis, a portion of all 
income allocated to Rex would be consideration for services provided 
and a portion would be a return on his contributed capital.147 That varies 
from the tax treatment Rex would obtain as sole owner. As sole owner of 
the office building, Rex would recognize income from the office building 
as rental income, and income from the sale of the office building would 
be gain from the sale of section 1231 property. Under a contribution-
focused analysis, Rex’s contribution of the property to a tax partnership 
would, in part, change the character of income he recognizes. Instead of 
only rental and section 1231 income he recognized as an individual, he 
would also recognize some services income as a service-contributing 
partner. That result is unjustified because the building continues to 
generate rental income after the partnership formation.  
The change of tax treatment would also cause inefficient results 
because parties would avoid partnership formation if the results were 
unfavorable, and they form partnerships to obtain favorable tax results 
when possible. For example, if services income increased Rex’s tax 
liability more than the benefit he would obtain by contributing the office 
building to a partnership, he would not join the partnership.148 Such 
inefficiency makes a contribution-focused analysis unattractive.    
Another unexpected result of a contribution-focused analysis is 
that partnership income allocated to a property contributor would be 
income from property. Thus, if Piers contributed dry cleaning assets and 
no services to Piergan LLC, a dry cleaning partnership formed with 
Morgan, all partnership income allocated to Piers should be rental 
income from the property or gain from the sale of the property. Thus, 
even though the partnership may have only income from services, when 
allocated to Piers, that income would transform to rental or other 
investment income. If Piers had contributed cash instead of property, 
income allocated to him should be interest income under a contribution-
focused analysis.  
A contribution-focused analysis ignores the operations at the 
partnership level and only considers the partners’ contributions. Thus, 
  
 146 See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 147 Professor Weisbach also considered this analysis. See Weisbach, supra note 20, 
at 736. 
 148 See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 103, at 331-48 (discussing the effects of tax on 
behavior). 
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the contribution-focused analysis should also require income from 
property to reflect the character of the property in the hands of the 
contributor. As a result, gain allocated to an investor from a dealer 
partnership should be capital gain income if the investor had contributed 
a capital asset. Such treatment would be a deviation from current law, 
except in cases where current law prohibits property owners from 
changing the character of income to obtain favorable tax results.149 A 
contribution-focused analysis should require the law to apply 
consistently to all situations. This potential result reveals how a 
contribution-focused analysis produces a result that is incongruous with 
established partnership tax rules. Changing tax rules is not necessarily a 
bad thing, but with respect to contribution focused-analysis, such a 
change would alter taxpayer behavior without generating taxable income.    
The ultimate effect of a consistent application of a contribution-
focused analysis would be uncertain. Some partnership income that is 
currently investment income would become services income when 
allocated to holders of profits-only partnership interests. Services income 
allocated to holders of capital-only partnership interests would become 
investment income. The result may be a wash from a revenue standpoint 
(the increased tax revenue from investment income converted to 
compensation income may be offset by services income converted to 
investment income). Nonetheless, if a contribution-focused analysis were 
to apply to profits-only partnership interests, it should apply to all other 
types of interests. Merely altering the tax treatment of holders of profits-
only partnership interests is inappropriate because it applies different 
standards to members of the same partnership.150 Thus, a contribution-
focused analysis is an unattractive tool for analyzing profits-only 
partnership interests. 
C. Ripple Effects of Partnership Disaggregation 
Using partnership disaggregation to tax profits-only partnership 
interests raises the policy concerns discussed above. It also would cause 
technical complexity. Recent proposed legislation illustrates the 
complexity that could result from partnership disaggregation. In apparent 
response to urgings from compensation proponents, proposed legislation 
would tax as compensation amounts allocated to a service provider with 
respect to profits-only interests in investment partnerships.151 The 
proposed legislation would thus disaggregate investment tax 
partnerships. The proposed legislation indicates that the proponents of 
  
 149 See I.R.C. § 724 (2006) (denying the conversion of ordinary income to capital gain 
and the conversion of capital loss to ordinary loss on contribution of property to a tax partnership). 
 150 Such different treatment appears to be an unjustified breach of horizontal equity. See 
supra text accompanying notes 112-114. 
 151 See Temporary Tax Relief Act of 2007, H.R. 3996, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, 
Nov. 9, 2007). 
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partnership disaggregation recognize that investment partnerships are 
different from other types of partnerships. Therefore, they attempt to 
limit partnership disaggregation to investment partnerships.152 Although 
it may be a noble attempt, the proposed legislation misses the mark by 
using partnership disaggregation. 
Partnership tax practitioners and members of the Partnerships & 
LLCs Committee of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation 
have uncovered many problems that the proposed legislation would 
create.153 Simply altering the character of partnership profits allocated to 
a service-providing partner mis-taxes the allocated amount. First, it does 
not provide an offsetting deduction for the amount characterized as 
compensation income.154 The payment of compensation generally results 
in a deduction for the party who pays the compensation.155 Failing to 
provide such a deduction creates an anomalous asymmetrical treatment 
of compensation. Second, it does not take into account other tax law 
provisions.156 For example, if the receipt of the interest were also a 
taxable event under section 83, the holder of the interest would be taxed 
a second time on allocations of partnership income.157 Third, the law 
must consider the tax treatment of non-U.S. partners in U.S. partnerships 
and U.S. partners in non-U.S. partnerships.158 Fourth, the law may 
mischaracterize gain or loss on the sale of a profits-only partnership 
interest and not properly account for the basis the purchaser would take 
in such interest.159 These and many other potential issues demonstrate 
that disaggregation will cause significant technical complexities.160 
The nature of partnerships makes partnership disaggregation an 
unattractive method for reducing the inequities caused by the current tax 
treatment of profits-only partnership interests. Partnership disaggregation 
also raises technical complexities that make the proposed rules 
  
 152 H.R. 3996, § 710(c) (limiting the scope of the section’s application to services 
provided with respect to securities, real estate, commodities, and options or derivatives in such 
property); see generally Fleischer, supra note 17 (focusing on private equity funds).  
 153 See Carol Kulish Harvey & Eric Lee, A Technical Walk Through the Carried Interest 
Provisions Contained in Chairman Rangel’s Tax Reform Proposal, TAXES, Feb. 2008, at 77; Schler, 
supra note 21; see also ABA Comments, supra note 21. This Part of the Article draws examples of 
technical complexity from those articles. 
 154 See Schler, supra note 21, at 847. 
 155 See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006). 
 156 See Schler, supra note 21, at 849. 
 157 In limited circumstances, the IRS appears prepared to use section 83 to tax the grant of 
profits-only partnership interests. See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-27 C.B. 343 (providing a safe harbor 
from taxation for grants of profits-only partnership interests). The proposed legislation does not 
eliminate that possibility. Therefore, the grant of the interest may be taxed, and income allocated 
with respect to the interest may be taxed. Because any value of the interest at the date of grant would 
include the estimated present value of future allocations, taxing the grant and allocations would 
create a double tax. 
 158 See Schler, supra note 21, at 854-57 (identifying the proposed legislation’s 
inadequacies regarding cross-border arrangements). 
 159 See id. at 865-67 . 
 160 Because commentators have thoroughly discussed those issues, this Article does not 
revisit them here in greater detail. 
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untenable. Therefore, partnership disaggregation appears to be an 
untenable solution to the problem profits-only interests raise. Part IV 
recommends partnership disregard as a better method for addressing 
concerns raised by profits-only partnership interests.  
IV. PARTNERSHIP DISREGARD 
“[T]hat which we call a rose [b]y any other name would smell as 
sweet[,]”161 and that which is a nonpartnership by any other name, 
including “partnership,” should remain a nonpartnership for tax 
purposes. Interestingly, the recent discussions about carried interests all 
appear to assume that the subject arrangements are tax partnerships, 
without scrutinizing the underlying agreements and economic 
arrangements.162 Although tax law specifically provides that state law 
classification of an arrangement does not determine its tax 
classification,163 commentary on profits-only partnership interests appears 
to disregard that aspect of federal tax entity classification.164 Blind 
acceptance of state law classification would provide taxpayers the 
opportunity to disguise any number of arrangements as tax partnerships 
and take advantage of the partnership tax law accounting and reporting 
rules (in particular, the allocation rules), even though tax policy does not 
support such classification.165 Furthermore, even if the current definition 
of tax partnership includes all of the various types of partnerships 
described above,166 the definition may be too broad and may need to be 
modified to address current business practices and modern partnership 
tax theory. 
  
 161 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. 
 162 Some commentators have suggested that profits-only partnership interests should be 
treated as implicit or constructive loans to the service provider. See Cunningham & Engler, supra 
note 110, at 122, 128-32 (advocating treating the carried interest as an implicit loan); Schmolka, 
supra note 20, at 302 (“Economically, that temporary shift is the equivalent of an interest-free, 
compensatory demand loan. Though the relationship among partners obviously is not that of debtor 
and creditor, the essential fact is that S’s services are in part compensated by S’s us of A’s and B’s 
money.”). Professor Schmolka did, however, raise partnership disregard as an appropriate way to 
analyze the proper tax treatment of a profits-only partnership interest. See id. at 299-301. The latter 
recognition that a purported partnership may not be a tax partnership is the essence of partnership 
disregard. Constructive recharacterization misses the mark because it fails to recognize the true 
nature of tax partnerships and because there is “no real loan.” See Schler, supra note 21, at 861-64. 
 163 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2006) (“Whether an organization is 
an entity separate from its owners for federal tax purposes is a matter of federal tax law and does not 
depend on whether the organization is recognized as an entity under local law.”). 
 164  See supra notes 16-17 (listing articles that discuss profits-only interests but fail to 
consider whether the arrangement satisfies the definition of tax partnership).  
 165 See Borden, supra note 34, at 1010-11 (presenting policy reasons for not relying upon 
state-law classification to define tax partnerships). For an example of disguising an arrangement, see 
supra text accompanying notes 8-15 (describing the use of a limited liability company to disguise an 
employment arrangement).  
 166 See supra Part II.A. (describing services partnerships, property-services partnerships, 
and investment partnerships). 
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Tax law can avoid the policy problems and tax complexities that 
partnership disaggregation would cause by focusing on whether an 
arrangement labeled a partnership comes within the definition of tax 
partnership and whether an interest labeled a partnership interest should 
be recognized for tax purposes. Tax law should disregard any 
arrangements that do not come within the definition of tax partnership. If 
an arrangement is a tax partnership, the analysis should consider whether 
any partners act in a nonpartner capacity. Such a focus will require 
clearer definitions of what a tax partnership is and when a partner acts in 
a nonpartner capacity. The recommendation to disaggregate partnerships 
may result from an inability to clearly identify and express the source of 
discomfort profits-only partnership interests cause. The misdiagnosis has 
led to a prescription that will not alleviate the discomfort, and which will 
have serious negative side effects.167 Partnership disregard is a better 
prescription for the perceived ills that profits-only partnership interests 
create. It requires examining whether an arrangement is a hired-services 
or hired-property arrangement or is a tax partnership. It also requires 
examining the capacity in which members of tax partnerships act. This 
analysis suggests that tax law should narrow the definition of tax 
partnership. A narrower definition of tax partnership will deprive service 
arrangements of the partnership allocation rules and will help ensure that 
compensation is taxed at ordinary rates. It will also help preserve the 
integrity of the partnership tax rules. 
A. Hired Services Versus Hired Property 
Partnership disregard examines an arrangement purporting to be 
a tax partnership. If the examination reveals the arrangement is not a tax 
partnership, it disregards the arrangement. Partnership disregard means 
tax law should treat any agreements between the parties as something 
other than a tax partnership. Disregarded arrangements should be either 
hired-services arrangements or hired-property arrangements. As 
described above, a partnership is an integration of at least two persons’ 
property and services or an integration of services of at least two 
persons.168 Hired-services and hired-property arrangements are not 
integrated arrangements. The service provider and property owner retain 
the residual claims of their respective resources.169 In the case of hired 
  
 167 See JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 24 (2008) (reporting that inadequate 
medical knowledge is rarely the cause of medical error, whereas up to fifteen percent of medical 
diagnoses are inaccurate); Kaveh G. Shojania, Elizabeth C. Burton, Kathryn M. McDonald & Lee 
Goldman, Changes in Rates of Autopsy-Detected Diagnostic Errors Over Time, 289 JAMA 2849, 
2850-52 (2003) (discussing the results of a study of diagnostic error rates detected in autopsies). The 
medical analogy may not be too far afield as lawyers and legal scholars are also surely open to the 
possibility of misdiagnosing legal problems. 
 168 See supra text accompanying note 83. 
 169 The parties may be able to share the residual claim of one resource (e.g., property) 
without becoming a tax partnership, if they do not share the residual claim of the other resource. See 
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services, income the service provider receives is compensation. In the 
case of hired property, income the property owner receives is interest or 
rent, depending upon the type of property and use.170 Payment as a share 
of profits should not change the classification of an arrangement as either 
hired services or hired property.171 In either such situation, the proprietor 
may determine the amount to pay for the hired item as a percentage of 
profits without converting the arrangement to a tax partnership.172 
Discussions regarding the taxation of profits-only partnership 
interests have focused mainly on the tax treatment of the service 
provider. If an analysis disregards a purported partnership, however, it 
should not automatically assume that the default arrangement is a hired-
services arrangement.173 Instead, after disregarding a partnership, the 
analysis must consider whether the arrangement is a hired-services 
arrangement or a hired-property arrangement.  
Unfortunately, the law is largely unhelpful with each of those 
determinations. The law does not clearly define the distinction between 
tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements.174 It also fails to delineate 
between hired-services and hired-property arrangements. This Article 
suggests that lawmakers and commentators should focus more effort on 
defining the distinctions necessary to properly disregard purported tax 
partnerships. Because the law has generally failed in this area, legal 
precedent provides very limited direction. Instead, the analysis should 
look to economic concepts to help draw the distinctions. Economic 
concepts help ensure that the law correctly places the incidence of 
taxation, regardless of precedent. 
Beginning with Professor R.H. Coase’s seminal work, The 
Nature of the Firm,175 economists have struggled to discover why parties 
join together to form business arrangements, identify the boundaries of 
  
supra text accompanying note 83 (describing partnerships as an integration of property and 
services). 
 170 For example, a property manager could hire an office building by leasing it from the 
owner and subleasing it to tenants. A borrower hires money and pays for it with interest. 
 171 See Grossman & Hart, supra note 39, at 694. 
 172 See, e.g., Arthur Venneri Co. v. United States, 340 F.2d 337, 342-43 (Ct. Cl. 1965) 
(holding that advance did not create a tax partnership, even though the creditor would share in the 
profits of the borrower), abrogation recognized by Consol. Flooring Servs. v. United States, 42 Fed. 
Cl. 878 (1999); Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1078-79 (1964) (holding that an arrangement was an 
employment arrangement, not a tax partnership, even though parties shared profits); Place v. 
Comm’r, 17 T.C. 199, 206 (1951), aff’d, 199 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1952) (holding that sharing of 
profits was not sufficient to show arrangement was tax partnership and not a lease). 
 173 One commentator analogized the holder of a carried interest to an entrepreneur 
borrowing money from the capital investors. See Weisbach, supra note 18. The focus of that 
commentary was on the taxation of the service provider, who would probably be able to report the 
gain from sale of assets acquired with the borrowed funds as capital gain. The commentary did not 
focus on the tax consequences to the lender. Taxing the share of gain allocated to the lender as 
interest would create significantly different tax consequences to the lender than those obtained if the 
arrangement is a partnership that allocates long-term capital gain to the property contributor. 
 174 See Borden, supra note 34, at 1008-31 (identifying inadequacies of the current 
definition of tax partnership). 
 175 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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business arrangements, and explain why arrangements engage in 
particular activities.176 The economists’ exploration of the reasons for 
forming business arrangements helps tax law identify the distinction 
between tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements. The discussion 
above suggested that the difference between disregarded arrangements 
and tax partnerships is the integration of property and services.177 
Economists theorize that parties integrate property and services to reduce 
transaction costs and to reduce appropriable quasi rent seeking 
activities.178 Because integration is the solution for certain economic 
concerns, it distinguishes firms from other types of arrangements. 
Integration also creates tax accounting complexity.179 That is why it 
should also distinguish tax partnerships from disregarded arrangements. 
To apply that test, the law must be able to identify integrated 
arrangements. 
A two-person arrangement is not integrated if one party retains 
the residual claim of either the property or services. The residual claim is 
“the right to control all aspects” of property or services not contracted 
away.180 To determine whether an arrangement is integrated, the analysis 
must ask whether one party retains the residual claim of either the 
property or services. The agreement among parties to an arrangement 
should reveal who holds the residual claim, regardless of the form used 
to memorialize the agreement. Thus, whether the agreement takes the 
form of a loan, employment agreement, a lease, a partnership agreement, 
or an operating agreement of a limited liability company is irrelevant. 
The analysis must examine any such agreement to determine whether the 
parties have integrated property and services. 
The examples presented above help illustrate how integration 
can distinguish disregarded arrangements from tax partnerships. Recall 
that Rex and Lee formed Leex Partnership by Rex contributing property 
and services and Lee contributing services.181 Assume they memorialize 
their agreement with a written partnership agreement that includes their 
allocation formulae and provides that the arrangement is perpetual. The 
agreement says nothing about how the partnership will distribute assets 
upon liquidation, so the state default rule applies.182 Thus, the partners’ 
  
 176 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 306. 
 177 See discussion supra Part II.C. Because the relevant analysis only concerns the 
difference between tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements, it assumes all integrated 
arrangements allocate economic items to their members. Thus, the arrangements would not be 
corporations. 
 178 See Coase, supra note 175, at 390-91 (claiming that internalizing transactions 
eliminates the need to negotiate each transaction); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 2, at 307 
(concluding that parties integrate if appropriable quasi rents are high). 
 179 See supra text accompanying notes 90-92 (demonstrating that integration makes 
tracing impossible). 
 180 See Grossman & Hart, supra note 39, at 695. 
 181 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 182 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(a) (1997), 6 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 73 (2001). 
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liquidating distributions will equal the sum of their contributions plus 
allocations, minus any distributions received from the partnership.183 By 
contributing the property to Leex Partnership, Rex forfeits the right to 
control all aspects of the property not contracted away. Rex no longer 
unilaterally controls the disposition of the property, the use of the 
property, or the power to exclude Lee from participating in managing the 
property.184  
By contributing services, Lee forfeits the economic benefit of 
performing such services for others.185 That forfeiture vests Rex with a 
portion of the residual claim of Lee’s services. If Lee were to perform 
office management services for the owner of another office building, Rex 
should be able to recover the economic damages such other services 
cause Rex.186 By sharing control of the property with Rex, Lee can also 
help prevent Rex from terminating her services. As sole owner of the 
property, Rex controlled who could provide services with respect to the 
property.187 He forfeits that control when the property and services 
merge. Rex’s and Lee’s mutual forfeiture of rights create a partnership. 
Contrast Leex Partnership with Chrichel LLC, with modified 
facts. Recall that Chrichel LLC was a lawn mowing service.188 Rachel 
contributed lawn mowing equipment and Christy agreed to use the 
equipment to mow lawns. Rachel and Christy agreed to divide the profits 
from the lawn mowing.189 Assume further that the parties agreed that at 
the end of the lawn mowing season Chrichel LLC would dissolve and 
distribute any cash to the parties according to their profit-sharing 
agreement and distribute the lawn mowing equipment and other assets to 
Rachel. Although the arrangement takes the form of a limited liability 
company, Rachel appears to retain the property’s residual claim. During 
the lawn mowing season Christy uses the equipment and other assets to 
mow lawns, but she has no interest in the property following the lawn 
mowing season. If the arrangement is profitable to Rachel, she may enter 
into a similar arrangement with Christy in a subsequent year, but she has 
no obligation to do so. Rachel appears to have contracted away the use 
and disposition rights during the lawn mowing season. Following the 
lawn mowing season, however, Rachel will possess the rights to control 
all aspects of the property. Therefore, Rachel retains the property’s 
residual claim and the parties did not integrate their resources. They 
merely used a limited liability operating agreement as the medium for a 
  
 183 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 401, 807, 6 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 133, 206. 
 184 This assumes the partnership agreement does not vest all such powers with Lee. If it 
had, then Lee would retain the residual claim of the property and the arrangement would not be a tax 
partnership.  
 185 See supra note 90. 
 186 See id. 
 187 See Hart & Moore, supra note 87, at 1121. 
 188 See supra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
 189 See supra text accompanying note 52. 
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hired-services or hired-property arrangement. As a result, the 
arrangement should not be a tax partnership under the integration test.  
An analysis that disregards a purported tax partnership must turn 
its focus to whether the disregarded arrangement is a hired-services or 
hired-property arrangement. That analysis would likely focus on who 
controls the property and services.190 If the service provider has control, 
the arrangement would be a hired-property arrangement. Alternatively, if 
the property owner has control, the arrangement would probably be a 
hired-services arrangement. Often, making such a distinction is difficult, 
especially if the parties have control, as partners do. For instance, in the 
Chrichel LLC example, if the law disregards the arrangement, it is either 
an employment arrangement or a lease. Either Rachel has hired Christy 
to mow the lawns, or Christy has leased the equipment from Rachel.  
Whereas residual claims determine whether an arrangement is a 
tax partnership or disregarded arrangement, control of current claims 
determines whether an arrangement is a hired-services or hired-property 
arrangement. For this purpose, the current claims of the property include 
its current use, and current claims of services include the power to 
control the economic product of the services. Therefore, if Rachel 
controls the use of the property and can direct Christy’s services for the 
duration of the agreement, the arrangement would be a hired-services 
arrangement. On the other hand, if Christy controls the use of the 
property for the duration of the agreement, the arrangement would be a 
hired-services arrangement.  
The tax classification of disregarded arrangements may 
significantly affect the tax liability of the parties. If the law disregards 
Chrichel LLC, and treats the arrangement as a hired-services 
arrangement, Rachel and Christy will both have services income. If the 
law treats the arrangement as a hired-property arrangement, Rachel will 
have rental income and Christy will have services income. Tax law treats 
each of those classes of income as ordinary income,191 so that 
classification does not alter the type of income.   
The different tax results could, however, be profound if the 
property were money. With money as the property, a hired-property 
arrangement would be a loan. Income paid to the property owner would 
be interest income.192 Income earned by the service provider would vary 
depending upon the use to which the service provider puts the money. If 
the service provider acquires a capital asset and the only income is from 
  
 190 Undoubtedly such an analysis will be difficult. No set standard exists for determining 
when joining property and services creates a tax partnership. See Borden, supra note 34, at 970-1001 
(describing the various tests Congress, courts, and the IRS use to define tax partnership). 
Furthermore, no set standards exist that delineate between hired property and hired services. A 
complete analysis requires, however, a justification for reaching a particular conclusion. An arbitrary 
selection will create inconsistent and perhaps unfair tax treatment of parties.  
 191 See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(A) (2006) (taxing at ordinary income rates any income that does 
not qualify for preferential rates) . 
 192 See id. § 61(a)(5). 
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gain on the sale of the asset more than one year after the acquisition, the 
income will be long-term capital gain to the service provider.193 If the 
service provider uses the money to start a dry cleaning business, income 
to the service provider will be services income.194 If the arrangement is a 
hired-services arrangement, income to the service provider will be 
compensation. Thus, the use to which a service provider puts its money 
can significantly affect the service provider’s tax liability. 
A service provider may use money to acquire a capital asset on 
the property owner’s behalf. If the only income from the property is from 
sale of the property more than one year following the acquisition, the 
income will be long-term capital gain to the property owner.195 If the 
property owner uses the money to fund a dry cleaning business, and hires 
the service provider to manage it, income to the property owner will be 
services income.196 Thus, if the property is money the different uses to 
which it is put can significantly affect the tax liability of both parties. 
Payments to the parties as a percent of profits should not affect the 
analysis or the outcome.197  
Suggesting that the law should treat a disregarded tax partnership 
as a hired-property arrangement may raise a hue and cry from the tax bar. 
An initial response may be that the arrangement cannot be a loan or a 
lease, and such consideration raises the debt-equity question (in the case 
of lending arrangements), which most of the bar would prefer to avoid. 
The debt-equity question is no more difficult, however, than the partner-
employee question.198 An analysis that assumes away a partnership must 
consider all possible outcomes and justify the selection of any particular 
one. If nothing justifies the fixation on a hired-services arrangement, an 
analysis that merely adopts that approach is unsound. A better analysis 
would examine the economics of an arrangement and allow the economic 
aspects to determine the classification.     
Once an analysis disregards a purported tax partnership and 
properly identifies the arrangement, the correct tax result falls into 
  
 193 See id. §§ 1(h), 1222(3). 
 194 See id. § 61(a)(1). 
 195  See id. § 1222(3). 
 196  See id. § 61(a)(1). 
 197 See, e.g., Arthur Venneri Co. v. United States, 340 F.2d 337, 342-43 (Ct. Cl. 1965) 
(holding that advance did not create a tax partnership, even though the creditor would share in the 
profits of the borrower); Place v. Comm’r, 17 T.C. 199, 206 (1951), aff’d, 199 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 
1952) (holding that sharing of profits was not sufficient to show arrangement was tax partnership 
and not a lease). 
 198 The cases considering each question do not definitively draw the line between a 
partnership and either an employment arrangement or a loan. See, e.g., Halen v. Comm’r, 203 F.2d 
815, 820 (5th Cir. 1953) (finding arrangement a tax partnership, not a loan); Joe Balestrieri & Co. v. 
Comm’r, 177 F.2d 867, 870-73 (9th Cir. 1949) (finding a loan, not a tax partnership); Tate v. Knox, 
131 F. Supp. 514, 517 (D. Minn. 1955) (finding arrangement an employment arrangement, not a tax 
partnership); Beck Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Comm’r, 27 T.C. 840, 853 (1957), acq. I.R.S. 
Announcement 1957-2 C.B. 3 (1957) (finding arrangement was a tax partnership, not an 
employment arrangement). 
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place.199 The analysis turns, however, on the definition of tax partnership. 
The definition of tax partnership leaves much to be desired. As the line 
separating disregarded arrangements from tax partnerships, the definition 
is very important.200 The definition of tax partnership needs further 
attention and refinement. Further study should also consider how to 
distinguish between hired-property and hired-services arrangements 
when an analysis disregards a purported partnership.201 The discussion 
above provides suggestions for such analyses. With further scrutiny, the 
integration test could improve and become viable quickly. 
B.  Partner/Nonpartner Capacity 
An analysis may conclude that an arrangement is a partnership 
and that the holder of a profits-only partnership interest is a partner but 
leave compensation proponents with a bitter distaste for the tax treatment 
of the profits-only partners. The distaste may result from a subconscious 
inkling that the holder of the interest is acting on behalf of the 
partnership in a nonpartner capacity. In such a situation, recommending 
partnership disaggregation flows from a misdiagnosis, and the 
subconscious inkling does not properly manifest itself in the 
recommendation to disaggregate the partnership.202 The discussion above 
demonstrates that parties may enter into agreements that look like 
partnership agreements primarily to obtain the tax benefits that only the 
partnership tax and accounting rules offer.203 Some tax-avoidance 
arrangements may come within the definition of tax partnership. The 
substance of such arrangements may, however, prove that a so-called 
partner is not a partner or is acting in a nonpartner capacity.204 An interest 
labeled “profits-only partnership interest” may be a combination of a 
profits-only partnership interest and an interest in the future profits of a 
  
 199 See supra text accompanying notes 191-197. 
 200 See Borden, supra note 34, at 974-75 (suggesting that the definition should derive 
from tax concepts); id. at 1028 (recommending the following as a definition of tax partnership: “a 
tax partnership is two or more persons, at least one of whom provides significant services, who have 
(or will have) common gross income”). 
 201 In TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006), the court held that the 
arrangement was not a tax partnership, and while characterizing it as “in the nature of a secured 
lender’s interest” or “secured loan,” it failed to identify what the arrangement was and how it should 
be taxed. See id. at 231, 241. Thus, the case showed how partnership disregard can help reduce 
abusive use of partnership tax rules, but it did not describe what the disregarded arrangement was. 
 202  See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 203 See S. COMM. ON FIN., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 
EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 228 (Comm. 
Print 1984) (“The fourth factor is whether, under all facts and circumstances, it appears the recipient 
became a partner primarily to obtain tax benefits for himself or the partnership which would not 
have been available if he had rendered the services to the partnership in a third party capacity.”). 
 204 Id. (“Treasury and courts should be careful not to be misled by possibly self-serving 
assertions in the partnership agreement as to the duties of a partner in his partner capacity but should 
instead seek the substance of the transaction.”). The compensation proponents’ distaste may be 
subconsciously sensing that service providers either are not partners in substance or they act in 
nonpartner capacities in substance. 
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partnership granted to the partner for services to be performed in a 
nonpartner capacity.205 Tax law should recognize such interest as part 
partnership interest and part compensatory arrangement.  
If a service provider holds a profits-only partnership interest and 
acts on behalf of the partnership in a nonpartner capacity, the analysis 
must determine the extent to which the service provider acts in a 
nonpartner capacity.206 Thus, the analysis performs three tasks: (1) it 
determines whether a partner acts in a nonpartner capacity, (2) it 
determines whether the partner acts in a partner capacity, and (3) it 
determines the extent to which the partner acts in each capacity. The 
current law does not provide clear guidance on any of those points. As 
Professor Weisbach states, “distinguishing ‘true’ from ‘disguised’ 
partners can be futile” under current law.207 Nonetheless, the distinction 
is important, and the law must develop to provide guidance regarding the 
difference between partner and nonpartner capacity. 
  
 205 The Eighth Circuit in Campbell v. Commissioner, recognized that so-called profits-
only partnership interests may actually be payments to a nonpartner, and the court stated:  
In Diamond, where the service provider became a partner solely to avoid receiving 
ordinary income, we have no doubt that the receipt of the profits interest was for services 
provided other than in a partner capacity. That is, Diamond was likely to (and in fact did) 
receive money equal to the value of his services and apparently did not intend to function 
as or remain a partner. Thus, the receipt of his partnership profits interest was properly 
taxable as easily calculable compensation for services performed. 
Campbell v. Comm’r, 943 F.2d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 1991).  
 206 The law on this issue is far from fully developed. See I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A) (2006) 
(providing that if a partner performs services, the partnership makes a related allocation and 
distribution to such partner, and the services and allocation and distribution viewed together are 
properly characterized as a transaction between a partnership and a partner acting in a nonpartner 
capacity, such allocation shall be treated as occurring between a partnership and a person who is not 
a partner). The legislative history of section 707(a)(2)(A) lists several factors that the Senate 
Committee on Finance suggests may indicate whether allocations and distributions are payments to a 
nonpartner and providing two examples of the application of the factors. See S. COMM. ON FIN., 
98TH CONG., 2D SESS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED 
BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 227-30 (Comm. Print 1984). The list has not proven 
entirely helpful. See MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 35, ¶ 13.02[4][a] (“Distinguishing 
‘true’ from ‘disguised’ partners is difficult. Congress identified the need to make this distinction 
when it enacted § 707(a)(2)(A) as part of the Deficit Restoration Act of 1984. Unfortunately, § 
707(a)(2)(A) does not come to grips with the difficult task of actually making the distinction.”). 
Furthermore, the case law and rulings that address the distinction between a partner acting in a 
partner capacity and a partner acting in a nonpartner capacity are generally difficult to distinguish 
and do not present clear general rules for drawing the distinction. See Pratt v. Comm’r, 550 F.2d 
1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that partners who managed a partnership were not acting in 
nonpartner capacities because the services they provided were duties for which the partnership was 
created); Rev. Rul. 81-301, 1981-2 C.B. 144 (ruling that an advisor partner who managed the 
investment and reinvestment of a partnership’s assets acted in a nonpartner capacity because the 
“advisor general partner” provided similar services to others as part of its regular trade or business, 
director partners supervised advisor partner’s work, director partners could fire advisor partner, and 
advisor partner could resign). 
 207 See Weisbach, supra note 20, at 731. After making that observation, Weisbach 
proceeded to apply the multi-factor test recommended by the Senate Committee on Finance and 
cursorily concluded that private equity sponsors act in a partner capacity. See id. at 731-32 (“[T]here 
is simply no question under current law that a typical private equity sponsor would be treated as a 
partner with respect to the carried interest and would not be subject to recharacterization under 
Section 707(a)(2)(A).”). 
2009] PROFITS-ONLY INTERESTS 1323 
 
Twenty-four years ago, Congress decreed by legislation that a 
partner acting in a nonpartner capacity should be taxed as an employee of 
the partnership.208 At that time, the Senate Committee on Finance 
instructed Treasury to promulgate regulations to define the distinction 
between partner and nonpartner capacities.209 Since that time, no legal 
guidance has emerged regarding the distinction. The lack of guidance 
does not indicate the issue is unimportant. Instead, it implies the issue is 
difficult and new analytical methods are required to create the needed 
guidance. The recent incorporation of economic theory into the analysis 
of partnership tax may help draw the distinction between partner and 
nonpartner capacities. 
A partnership, as an integration of property and services, grants 
the service provider an interest in the residual claim of the property and 
the property owner an interest in the residual claim of the services.210 The 
Senate Committee on Finance listed several factors that indicate whether 
a partner acts in a nonpartner capacity.211 The factors fail to account for 
integration.212 This Article demonstrates that integration provides a model 
for determining whether a partner acts in a nonpartner capacity. For 
property and services to be fully integrated, the service provider must 
share in the residual claim of the property. Recall that the holders of 
property’s residual claim retain the rights to control all aspects of the 
property not specifically contracted away.213 The holder of the residual 
claim thus controls who may provide services with respect to the 
property.214 The holder of property’s residual claim may provide services 
with respect to the property at the holder’s discretion. An employee has 
the right to provide services with respect to the property only as agreed 
to by the holder of the property’s residual claim. Thus, holders of a 
property’s residual claim may hire service providers to provide certain 
services with respect to the property and may fire them. Consequently, a 
service provider who does not control hiring with respect to the property 
does not share the residual claim of the property and is an employee, not 
a partner, at least with respect to a particular type of services. That 
distinction helps identify when a service provider acts in a nonpartner 
capacity. 
  
 208 See I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 209 See S. COMM. ON FIN., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 
EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 226 (Comm. 
Print 1984). 
 210 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. 
 211 See S. COMM. ON FIN., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 
EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 227-28 
(Comm. Print 1984). 
 212 The factors focus instead on financial concepts such as risk, proximity of services and 
distributions, permanency of relationship, and tax motivation. Id. That is not surprising as the 
Committee listed the factors vaguely as suggestions. See id. at 227. Surely the Committee believed 
Treasury would carefully examine the factors and work out any deficiencies. 
 213 See Grossman & Hart, supra note 39, at 695. 
 214 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. 
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To be a partner, a service provider must share the residual claim 
of any partnership property.215 That means that the service provider must 
share control of who can provide services with respect to the property.216 
That control will not be unilateral in a partnership because the other 
members of the partnership share the control. As a body, the partners 
may decide who will provide certain services with respect to the 
property. For example, in the case of Piergan LLC, described above,217 
Piers and Morgan could agree that together they will determine who will 
maintain the dry cleaning equipment. Under such an agreement, Morgan 
would share in control of the maintenance as a partner. He could not 
unilaterally decide who would perform the maintenance services. Thus, 
if Morgan performed the services, it would be at the discretion of the 
partners, and he would not act in his partner capacity.  
Contrast that to Morgan acting in a partner capacity. Because the 
arrangement is a limited liability company, the company could be 
member-managed.218 The operating agreement might specify those 
services Morgan has a right and obligation to perform as a member of the 
company.219 Those services may include, or specifically exclude, 
maintaining the dry cleaning equipment. If that were the case, Morgan 
would be able to provide such services pursuant to the operating 
agreement, not at the discretion of the partners. In other words, if the 
operating agreement made maintenance of the equipment part of 
Morgan’s contributed services, the partners could not fire Morgan for 
performing such services without amending the arrangement’s governing 
documents. That distinction (requiring an amendment to the governing 
document versus the partners making a management decision) should 
distinguish partner capacity from nonpartner capacity. If the partner can 
act pursuant to the governing documents, the partner acts in a partner 
capacity. If the partner acts at the discretion of the partners, the partner 
acts in a nonpartner capacity.  
If the law determines that a portion of partnership income 
allocated to a partner is for services performed in a nonpartner capacity, 
it should bifurcate the service provider’s share of profits into two 
categories.220 One category would be profits allocated to the service 
  
 215 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. The substantive law definition of 
partnership requires the sharing of residual claims by providing that a partnership is a co-ownership 
of property. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 61 (2001). 
 216 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. 
 217 See supra text accompanying notes 148-149. 
 218 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(a)(1) (1996), 6B U.L.A. 585 (2008). 
 219  Id. § 103, 6B U.L.A. at 563. 
 220 This reflects the intent of Congress at the time it enacted section 707(a)(2)(A). See S. 
COMM. ON FIN., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF 
PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 228 (Comm. Print 1984) (“In 
the case of allocations which are only partly determined to be related to the performance of services 
for . . . the partnership, the provision will apply to that portion of the allocation which is reasonably 
determined to be related to the . . . services provided to the partnership.”). 
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provider as a partner. That share of profits should bear the character 
determined at the partnership level for all of the reasons described 
above.221 The other category would be profits allocated to the service 
provider as a nonpartner. That share of profits should be compensation 
income.222 Thus, the law taxes a partner acting in a nonpartner capacity 
like it taxes a nonpartner who provides services to a partnership, to the 
extent the partner is compensated for nonpartner services. The law 
already provides for such treatment, once the capacity is known.223  
The timing of income from the right to future profits granted to a 
nonpartner (or partner acting as nonpartner) depends upon the nature of 
the rights granted.224 The right to future partnership profits granted to a 
nonpartner (or partner acting as a nonpartner) should trigger 
compensation income to the service provider either at the time of the 
grant, as the profits accrue, or when the partnership pays the service 
provider.225 For example, if the grant gives the grantee the unconditional 
and transferable right to an interest in future partnership profits, the 
grantee should have income upon receipt of the right, which would be 
similar to the taxation of compensatory stock.226 The grant of an interest 
in a partnership’s future profits may, however, be more similar to an 
employment arrangement pursuant to which the employer agrees to pay 
the employee out of future profits.227 Under such an arrangement, the 
grantee of the profits interest would recognize income as the partnership 
profits accrue or as the partnership pays the service provider a share of 
the profits.228 The partnership should take an offsetting deduction or 
capitalize the expense under existing laws. 
  
 221 See supra Part II.C. 
 222 See I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A) (2006) (providing that tax law may treat amounts paid to a 
service-providing partner acting in a nonpartner capacity as amounts paid to a nonpartner). But see 
supra text accompanying notes 118-131 (describing why income allocated to a partner acting on 
behalf of the partnership in a nonpartner capacity should not be compensation income). 
 223 See I.R.C. § 707(a) (providing that a partner who acts in a nonpartner capacity shall be 
treated as a nonpartner for tax purposes); see also MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 35, ¶ 
13.02[4][a] (discussing the tax treatment of a partner acting in a nonpartner capacity and a 
partnership allocating partnership items to a partner acting in a nonpartner capacity). 
 224 See Mark P. Gergen, Pooling or Exchange: The Taxation of Joint Ventures Between 
Labor and Capital, 44 TAX. L. REV. 519, 523-25 (1989) (discussing the different tax consequences 
under pooling and exchange regimes). 
 225 See Weisbach, supra note 20, at 728-33. 
 226 See I.R.C. § 83(a) (requiring taxpayers to include in gross income the value of 
property received in exchange for services at the time “the beneficial interest[s] in such property are 
transferable” and “not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture”); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as 
amended in 2005) (defining property to include “real and personal property other than either money 
or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future”). 
 227 Every employment arrangement grants the employee some right to the employee’s 
future income. The law does not, however, require the employee to recognize services income at the 
time of the contract. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (providing that a mere “promise to pay” is not 
property). 
 228 The right to future profits would not satisfy the Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) definition of 
property because it would be “unfunded and unsecured.” Id. 
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The law taxes income allocated to a service provider properly if 
the service provider is a nonpartner or acts in a nonpartner capacity. The 
difficulty, however, is in correctly describing and identifying 
arrangements that are not tax partnerships and partners who act in 
nonpartner capacities.229 The discussion above presents some possibilities 
for drawing the distinction between partner and nonpartner capacities. 
The intellectual power of the partnership tax bar, tax academics, and law 
makers should focus on developing tools that will help properly diagnose 
such arrangements.230 Principles of division of labor suggest that 
academics should carefully study and articulate partnership tax theory as 
it relates to the difference between tax partnerships, and disregarded 
arrangements and partners acting in nonpartner capacities.231 They may 
consider many of the developments in the theory of the firm and other 
economic thought in their studies. Members of the bar can apply their 
technical skills and familiarity with current business practices to help 
create the needed tools. Surely the combined resources of both camps 
can work toward suitable conclusions of these most difficult concepts. 
Attention should also focus on whether the definition of tax partnership 
should include investment partnerships. 
C. Investment Partnership Misconception 
The analysis of profits-only partnership interests will not be 
complete until it revisits the definition of tax partnership. The ongoing 
debate over the proper tax treatment of profits-only partnership interests 
  
 229 One commentator cursorily concluded that holders of carried interests satisfy the 
factors listed in the Senate Committee on Finance’s 1984 committee print and therefore act as 
partners. See Weisbach, supra note 18. An analysis of this issue requires more than a cursory 
conclusion that the factors apply. Rather, the analysis must include a careful examination of the 
factors to determine whether they adequately distinguish between partners acting in partner and 
nonpartner capacities. 
 230 In 1984, the Senate Committee on Finance directed Treasury to draft regulations that 
would help define the line between partners acting in partner and nonpartner capacities. See S. 
COMM. ON FIN., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF 
PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 226-27 (Comm. Print 1984). As 
of the date of this Article, twenty-four years after the direction from the Senate Committee on 
Finance, no regulations exist providing such guidance. The recent focus on carried interests suggests 
the time is ripe to revisit the issue and begin working to define when a partner acts in a nonpartner 
capacity. 
 231 The division of labor is a well-documented principle of economics. See ADAM SMITH, 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 7-21 (Edwin Cannan ed., University of Chicago Press, 1976) (1776). Division 
of labor becomes more important as an economy develops and is advantageous to all persons 
employed. See id. at 351-71. The concept should apply equally to intellectual pursuits in the law. 
Scholars will have more and more difficulty maintaining the technical proficiency that practitioners 
must maintain to competently serve clients. As practitioners develop expertise, their proficiency will 
increase. Practitioners’ time demands will, however, prohibit them from performing theoretical 
research. That task must fall to scholars, who will sacrifice technical proficiency to some extent to 
study the theory of the law. Without a theoretical foundation, the law may produce undesirable 
results. In fact, without thought concerning the theory of partnership taxation, it may fall prey to 
taxpayers who use it to gain favorable tax treatment for transactions that otherwise would not qualify 
for such treatment. See, e.g., Borden, supra note 47, at 338-46 (describing how taxpayers use the 
partnership tax allocation rules to exchange tax items in a manner that the law otherwise prohibits). 
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concerns the proper tax treatment of holders of such interests in 
investment partnerships.232 Earlier theoretical work suggested that 
investment partnerships should not qualify for partnership tax 
treatment.233 The reasoning deems the nominal level of activity 
performed by members of an investment partnership too insignificant to 
warrant access to the partnership tax accounting and reporting rules.234 
Recall that the nature of tax partnerships makes tracing income from its 
source difficult.235 Because tracing is difficult, tax law allows partners to 
allocate tax items by agreement.236 If parties can trace income from its 
source, however, they do not need the partnership tax rules, and such 
arrangements should not be tax partnerships.  
By definition, investment partnerships should be able to trace 
income from its source and should not be tax partnerships. Property held 
by investment partnerships should come within the definition of capital 
asset.237 To come within the definition of capital asset, the income from 
the property must be almost exclusively from appreciation in the value of 
the property.238 Thus, the income from investment partnerships derives 
from the increase in the value of the property and services become an 
insignificant income-producing factor. In other words, investment 
partnerships do not integrate property and services; they rely solely on 
the property for income. The absence of property-service integration in 
an investment partnership makes tracing income from the property 
simple. Because the income in an investment partnership is traceable, the 
  
 232 See supra text accompanying note 64. 
 233 See Borden, supra note 34, at 992-93; Borden, supra note 101, at 360. 
 234 See Borden, supra note 34, at 1014-15. 
 235 See supra text accompanying notes 90-97. 
 236 See I.R.C. § 704(a) (2006). Tax law will recognize agreed-upon allocations as long as 
they have substantial economic effect, see id. § 704(b), a test that is more difficult to understand than 
satisfy. See Jones, supra note 47, at 1077-93 (describing the test and potential abuses). 
 237 Investment partnerships may have business-use assets such as rental property, which is 
section 1231 property, not a capital asset. The typical investment partnership, however, is one that 
holds property to realize its appreciation in value. The most significant income of such partnerships 
is income from the sale of the capital assets.  
 238 In some cases with very narrow facts, courts have held that the activities of owners to 
improve the value of property did not cause the property to lose its capital asset status. See, e.g., 
Estate of Barrios v. Comm’r, 265 F.2d 517, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that value-improving 
services do not taint the classification of the property where the owners acquired the property with a 
clear investment intent). But see Sanders v. United States, 740 F.2d 886, 888-89 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that value-improving services are a factor that helped the court decide that property was 
dealer property where the intent at the time of acquisition was clearly to improve and dispose of the 
property). Also, property held by a securities trader will be a capital asset, even if the trader engages 
in a significant amount of activity. See Marrin v. Comm’r, 147 F.3d 147, 151-53 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that individuals were traders because they did not hold property for sale to customers as 
required in section 1221(1)). The rule regarding the tax treatment of trader property is an 
anachronism and finds no support in current tax policy. See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 31.04[2] (3d ed. 2002); Shu-Yi Oei, A Structural Critique of 
Trader Taxation, FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2009). Thus, although gains recognized by some 
partnerships with significant activity may qualify for capital gains treatment, this Article agrees with 
the position that such tax treatment disregards sound tax policy and reaches the incorrect theoretical 
result.  
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arrangement does not need the partnership tax accounting and reporting 
rules. All income can be traced from the property to the property 
contributors, and the property contributors should recognize income from 
the property.239 To the extent another party provides investment services, 
income paid to that party out of profits should be compensation. If 
income is paid in the form of an interest in the property, the service 
provider should have compensation income upon receipt of the 
interest.240  
The current federal definition of tax partnership appears to 
include investment partnerships,241 but grants them the option to elect out 
of all or part of subchapter K under section 761 of the Code.242 
Partnerships that elect out of subchapter K under section 761 are 
qualified tax partnerships.243 With virtually no explanation of the reason 
for qualified tax investment partnerships, speculation directs the 
analysis.244 The breadth of the definition of tax partnership subjects 
investment partnerships to the partnership tax accounting and reporting 
rules. The simplicity of investment partnerships (a single source of 
income traceable from the property) does not justify the application of 
the complex partnership tax accounting and reporting rules. The 
members of an investment partnership should merely allocate partnership 
income to the members based upon their ownership interests in the 
property. In apparent recognition of such simplicity, Congress provided 
an option for such arrangements to elect out of subchapter K.245 Thus, 
subchapter K is elective for investment partnerships, and many 
investment partnerships elect to remain within subchapter K because the 
allocation rules provide such wonderful planning opportunities. The 
election for investment partnerships further indicates, however, that they 
do not require the partnership tax accounting and reporting rules.  
One way to address the concern raised by profits-only 
partnership interests in investment partnerships (which is the source of 
the carried interest debate and the primary concern about profits-only 
partnership interests) is to narrow the definition of tax partnership to 
  
 239 In the case of an exchange of assets that does not have a significant services 
component, the parties would recognize gain upon exchange because the transaction is treated as 
transfer of property for services, see Gergen, supra note 224, at 521-22, unless some other 
nonrecognition provision, such as section 1031 applied to the exchange. 
 240 See I.R.C. § 83(a); Gergen, supra note 224, at 522. 
 241 See Borden, supra note 101, at 331-33. 
 242 See I.R.C. § 761(a)(1). 
 243 The IRS coined the phrase “qualified partnership” in 1948. See I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 
126, 129 (“The Bureau, under [I.T. 2749 and I.T. 2785] has consistently treated all such operating 
agreements as creating qualified partnerships . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Borden, supra note 
101, at 325 (explaining briefly the history of the development of the qualified tax partnership 
concept). This Article uses “qualified tax partnership” instead of “qualified partnership,” as used 
originally by the IRS, and the term “tax partnership” to refer to arrangements tax law recognizes as 
partnerships.  
 244 See Borden, supra note 101, at 332. 
 245  See I.R.C. § 761(a). 
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exclude investment partnerships. The option such arrangements have to 
elect out of subchapter K246 is evidence that they do not need to be 
subject to partnership taxation. The members of such arrangements can 
determine their respective shares of income and loss without using the 
partnership tax accounting and reporting rules. The broad definition of 
tax partnership currently provides members of investment partnerships 
the opportunity to take advantage of the partnership tax accounting and 
reporting rules, even though policy does not justify such use.247 Changing 
the focus of analysis from the proper tax treatment of a partner with a 
profits-only interest to whether the definition of tax partnership should 
include investment partnerships would help resolve the concern raised by 
profits-only partnership interests in investment partnerships. Because that 
is the main focus of compensation proponents’ concern, such a change 
would resolve many of the iniquities of profits-only partnership interests. 
If the definition of tax partnership excluded investment 
partnerships, the analysis of carried interests would become simple. All 
profits from the property would belong to the property owners. Any 
profits allocated to the service provider would be compensation income 
to the service provider in the case of a hired-services arrangement.248 A 
service provider, who becomes a co-owner of the property upon 
formation of the arrangement, would have income upon receipt of the 
interest in property.249 Income allocated to the property owner would be 
interest or rent if the arrangement were a hired-property arrangement.250 
Existing tax laws could easily handle either type of arrangement.  
Changing the definition of tax partnership would create a catch 
twenty-two for property owners and service providers and would help 
stop tax abuse. To argue that the arrangement sufficiently integrated 
property and services to warrant the use of partnership tax and 
accounting rules, the parties would have to argue that services were 
integrated to the arrangement’s success. If the services were that 
significant, the property would not come within the definition of capital 
asset.251 If the parties were to argue that the property came within the 
definition of capital asset, they would have to concede that the 
arrangement did not have sufficient services to warrant tax partnership 
classification. A definition of tax partnership that excludes investment 
partnerships thus alleviates the stress the current system now bears.252 It 
would also help discourage tax game-playing. 
  
 246  Id. 
 247 See Borden, supra note 34, at 951-56 (explaining that partnership tax should apply to 
arrangements that are unable to trace income from its source to the owner of the income’s source). 
 248 See supra text accompanying notes 191. 
 249  See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
 250 See supra text accompanying notes 192-197. 
 251 See supra text accompanying notes 61-64. 
 252 Such a change in definition would not, however, preclude tax partnerships from 
holding investment property. It is very possible, for example, that Piergan LLC might retain some of 
 
1330 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4  
 
In contrast, a definition of tax partnership that excludes 
investment partnerships would not affect the tax treatment of profits-only 
partnership interests in services partnerships and property-services 
partnerships. The income of such partnerships derives from the 
combination of at least two persons’ services or services and property.253 
Tracing income from the source of such arrangements is impossible,254 so 
the members need the partnership tax accounting and reporting rules. 
The main issue with such arrangements would be the extent to which the 
service provider received a share of partnership profits for services 
performed in a non-partner capacity.255 Partnership disregard helps 
distinguish between the different types of arrangements by focusing on 
the capacity in which a service provider provides services. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Profits-only partnership interests present an inviting intellectual 
challenge for scholars and law makers but also create opportunities for 
tax game playing and abuse. This Article has demonstrated that proposed 
solutions requiring partnership disaggregation do not adequately solve 
the problem. First, partnership disaggregation ignores the nature of 
partnerships. Second, it threatens the integrity of partnership tax law and 
the application of other provisions of tax law. Third, it encourages tax 
game-playing. Thus, partnership disaggregation is not an attractive 
means for remedying the tax treatment of profits-only partnership 
interests.  
Partnership disregard, on the other hand, presents a viable 
method for addressing profits-only partnership interests. Partnership 
disregard eliminates the inequity of the current rules, recognizes the 
nature of tax partnerships, and preserves the integrity of subchapter K 
without frustrating other areas of tax law. Intellectual attention should 
focus on establishing analytical tools for determining when a purported 
tax partnership should be disregarded and when a partner acts in a 
nonpartner capacity. An interest labeled “profits-only partnership 
interest” may be an employment arrangement loan, or lease, at least in 
  
its earnings to acquire a capital asset, such as corporate stock. See supra text accompanying notes 
148-149 (presenting the Piergan LLC facts). If the partnership did not actively trade the stock, it 
should qualify as a capital asset, and if the partnership were to later sell the stock, any gain from the 
stock should be capital gain. That gain should retain its character as it flows through from the 
partnership. One reason for distinguishing this situation from an investment partnership is that the 
economics of the arrangement between Piers and Morgan is so economically complicated that they 
would not form the arrangement merely to obtain capital gain preferences on some of the residual 
earnings of the endeavor. 
 253 See supra Part II.A.1. (describing a services partnership as a combination of the 
services of two or more persons); supra Part II.A.2. (describing a property-services partnership as a 
combination of property and services of two or more persons). 
 254 See discussion supra Part II.C. (discussing the consequences of integrating services or 
property and services). 
 255 See supra Part IV.B. (discussing partner/nonpartner capacity). 
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part. If tools existed to help identify such arrangements, the taxation of 
disregarded partnerships would become obvious. 
Simply identifying arrangements that do not come within the 
current definition of tax partnership may not be sufficient. Attention 
must also focus on the definition of tax partnership to ensure that it is not 
too broad. This Article has suggested that the current definition of tax 
partnership, which includes investment partnerships, is too broad. 
Investment partnerships have no business using the partnership tax 
accounting and reporting rules and should be excluded from doing so. 
Narrowing the definition of tax partnership would properly exclude them 
from subchapter K. Such exclusion would eliminate the angst created by 
the current tax treatment of carried interests and would help preserve the 
integrity of subchapter K and recognize the nature of tax partnerships 
and their unique needs.  
The current interpretation of the definition of tax partnership 
encourages parties to choose one business form over another. As 
demonstrated above, Cory and Travis could transform an employment 
arrangement into a tax partnership by using a limited liability company 
instead of an employment contract.256 That change in form may not 
change the substance of the arrangement. Partnership disregard’s focus 
on the economic aspects of arrangements elevates substance over form. 
Partnership disregard thus helps tax the parties’ true economic 
arrangement, reduces tax game-playing, preserves the integrity of the 
partnership taxation, and promotes equity.  
  
 256 See supra text accompanying notes 8-15. 
